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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
President George W. Bush was visiting an elementary school in Sarasota, Florida on the 
morning of September 11, 2001, when he learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center. Bush 
was reading to second graders to promote his education initiative when his chief of staff, Andrew 
Card, whispered in his ear that a second plane had hit the second tower of the World Trade 
Center. It was clear then that the first crash had not been an accident and America was under 
attack. Bush finished reading and posed for photos with students and faculty. After watching the 
news report in an empty classroom and delivering a brief statement at the school, Bush and his 
entourage were rushed to Air Force One—their destination still undetermined. He would spend 
critical hours that morning sequestered in the skies, frustrated by a lack of information and 
difficult communication, unable to return to Washington.1   
Meanwhile, in the White House Vice President Dick Cheney was in his West Wing office 
on the morning of September 11 watching news coverage of the first airplane hitting the North 
Tower of the World Trade Center when the second plane crashed into the South Tower. After 
receiving reports that another hijacked plane was headed for Washington, Secret Service rushed 
Cheney into a bunker below the East Wing of the White House.2 The Presidential Emergency 
Operations Center where Cheney and some senior White House staff were moved to had a few 
days’ worth of food and supplies, beds, a conference room, and a secure phone. It was originally 
                                                
1 “The Vice President Appears on Meet the Press with Tim Russert,” George W. Bush White House Archives, 




built for President Franklin D. Roosevelt during World War II as protection against air raids, but 
until September 11, 2001, had never before been used in a crisis.3 
In Manhattan and at the Pentagon, and soon after in a field in Pennsylvania, smoke and 
debris filled the air in what would be the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil, killing 2,977 
people and leaving many more injured. In the bunker, with Bush under military protection away 
from Washington, Cheney took charge.4 After telling Bush not to return to Washington, one of 
Cheney’s first actions was giving a go-ahead order to the Air Force to shoot down a passenger 
plane headed towards Washington, which would kill the forty-five people on board, to prevent 
another disastrous strike.5 The order turned out to be irrelevant—the plane, United Airlines 
Flight 93, had already crashed into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers and crew attempted 
to regain control from the hijackers before the shoot-down order could be been passed down to 
the fighter pilots.6 Bush and Cheney would later claim that the president made the decision and 
Cheney relayed the order, as they told the 9/11 Commission, which investigated the attacks, but 
after looking at call logs, White House Military Office logs, and interviews with other people in 
the room, the Commission found no confirmation of Cheney’s call to Bush to authorize the 
order.7 Instead, evidence suggests that Cheney made the decision by himself and later cleared it 
with the president.8 While the dispute over the order turned out to be inconsequential to the 
events of the day, it illustrates Cheney’s willingness to take control and exercise executive power 
and Bush’s deference to his Vice President. As the war on terror progressed, Cheney would 
                                                
3 Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy, 
First edition (New York: Little, Brown, 2007), 3. 
4 James Mann, “The World Dick Cheney Built,” The Atlantic, January 2, 2020, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/dick-cheney-charted-americas-future-september-11/603313/. 
5 Savage, Takeover, 4. 
6 Ibid., 5. 
7 9/11 Commission, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” July 22, 2004, 41. 
8 Mann, “The World Dick Cheney Built.” 
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continue to play a central role in guiding the administration’s policies, becoming a leading 
architect of the war at home and abroad.  
Cheney’s powerful role was in part a product of his experience in federal government, 
which far surpassed that of Bush. Before his presidency, Bush had served for just over one term 
as governor of Texas, though he had closely observed his father’s White House a decade earlier. 
Cheney, meanwhile, had worked in the Richard Nixon administration, served as President Gerald 
Ford’s chief of staff, represented Wyoming in the House of Representatives for a decade, and 
had been President George H.W. Bush’s Secretary of Defense. His experience and understanding 
of the inner workings of the federal government allowed him to play a powerful role in the 
administration, making him, as many argue, the most powerful vice president in history.9 And 
Cheney brought his allies, who like him were familiar with how the federal government 
functioned, into many senior positions throughout the administration.10 
Cheney had long advocated for strong presidential powers, which he believed to have 
been diminished following the Vietnam War and Watergate scandal. After working in three 
presidential administrations, he had watched presidential power be challenged and had staunchly 
defended the authority of the president. During his time in the Ford White House, Cheney saw 
first-hand how a series of laws passed in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate curtailed the 
president’s power, and during his tenure in Congress, Cheney defended executive power and the 
Reagan administration in the Iran Contra scandal.11 Bush made clear that he wanted to strengthen 
executive power; “I'm not going to let Congress erode the power of the executive branch. I have 
                                                
9 Jim Kelly, “Figuring Out Who Really Had the Last Word in the Bush White House,” The New York Times, 
October 21, 2013, sec. Books, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/books/days-of-fire-peter-bakers-book-about-
bush-and-cheney.html. 
10 Savage, Takeover, 7. 
11 Ibid., 9. 
	 4 
a duty to protect the executive branch from legislative encroachment,” Bush said in 2002.12 But 
Cheney, in particular, made it a central part of his personal mission based on his long-standing 
interest in enhancing executive power. In 2002, he laid out his vision for the presidency: “In 34 
years, I have repeatedly seen an erosion of the powers and the ability of the president of the 
United States to do his job…One of the things that I feel an obligation—and I know the president 
does too—is to pass on our offices in better shape than we found them to our successors.”13 The 
September 11 attacks gave Cheney and his allies the opportunity to advance his enduring views 
of executive power.  
Among those working with Cheney on the project to expand presidential power was first 
and foremost David Addington, legal counsel and long-time advisor to the Vice President, as 
well as Timothy Flanigan, Deputy White House Counsel. They found an ally in John Yoo, 
deputy assistant attorney general in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and 
former law professor at the University of California, Berkeley. The OLC is a little-known but 
highly important office in the Justice Department that advises members of the executive branch, 
including the president, on the lawfulness of their proposed actions. Its significance stems from 
the fact that an advisory opinion issued by the OLC becomes a binding interpretation of the law 
that the executive branch must follow. Yoo—an ardent supporter of vast, inherent executive 
power whose legal opinions drew broad scrutiny from his academic peers—was the senior-most 
member of the OLC on September 11, 2001, because the head of the office had yet to be 
confirmed by the Senate. As such, he was called on to craft several of the OLC’s first legal 
                                                
12 George Bush, “Transcript of Bush Press Conference - March 13, 2002,” CNN, March 13, 2002, 
https://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/03/13/bush.transcript/index.html. 
13 Caroline Daniel, “Bush’s ‘Imperial’ Presidency,” Financial Times, July 5, 2006, 
https://www.ft.com/content/d97b1b48-0c4f-11db-86c7-0000779e2340. 
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opinions after the attacks and he developed a pipeline between the OLC and the White House 
that was used time and again to ensure Bush had broad powers to fight the war on terror.  
The September 11 attacks ushered in a new chapter of American history and created an 
atmosphere of fear and emergency. The post-September 11 era has been marked by heightened 
security, increased government action in combating terrorism, and a seemingly never-ending war 
on terror. It was in this context that the enemy combatant policies were conceived by the Bush 
administration. The administration decided that suspected terrorists or those determined to have 
aided terrorists conspiring against the United States would be detained and classified as “enemy 
combatants.” This was a largely new category of prisoners created by the Bush administration 
(though they claimed otherwise) who were neither prisoners of war protected under international 
law nor civilians. They would include noncitizens and citizens—those captured on foreign 
battlefields and American soil. They would be detained by the United States, held indefinitely 
without charge or access to a lawyer, and subject to trial by military commission.  
The enemy combatant policies, like the administration’s other policies in the realm of 
national security and beyond, were based on a doctrine of expansive presidential power. Not only 
were these claims of power broad in the scope of what the president was allowed to do, but they 
were also rooted in the idea that the president was given these powers by the Constitution, and 
thus claimed that these powers were inherent to the office of the presidency. Most notable were 
claims that appealed to the president’s power as commander in chief. The administration’s 
lawyers repeatedly asserted that by naming the president commander in chief, the Constitution 
granted the president vast and exclusive authority over the conduct of war, which allowed him to 
take action without Congressional interference or judicial review.  
	 6 
Throughout American history, presidents have pushed the limits of their constitutional 
powers during times of war, and the other two branches of government have stepped back, 
yielding greater power to the president. But at the end of wars, the balance of power often shifted 
back towards normalcy. During the war on terror, the Bush administration, like wartime 
administrations before it, claimed executive power to protect the nation. But its claims of power 
were more drastic than before with no clear end in sight. As The Washington Post reporter Bart 
Gellman explained, "What was new and innovative here, and quite radical, was the notion that 
the president's interpretation could not be challenged, that because the executive is a separate 
branch, courts and Congress could not tell the president, in any way, how to exercise his powers 
as commander in chief."14 And because a lot of the expansion of power took place in secret, it 
was particularly difficult for Congress or the judiciary to act. This theory of inherent presidential 
power served as the foundation for various elements of the enemy combatant policy—from how 
and where suspected terrorists would be detained, to how they would be treated and tried.   
This paper charts the enemy combatant policies in an attempt to understand how the 
policies were conceived and what their implications are to the American political system. It 
addresses questions not only about the scope of presidential power but also of the source of 
presidential authority. It considers the theories of presidential power that were used to support 
the policies, how they were developed and implemented, the extent to which they were 
challenged in the courts and by Congress, and their legacies. I argue that the Bush 
administration’s broad theory of inherent executive power allowed for the creation and 
expansion of a new class of prisoners—the enemy combatants—who were at the center of a 
larger effort to reorganize political power. In creating this policy, the administration attempted to 
                                                
14 Nina Totenberg, “Cheney: A VP With Unprecedented Power,” NPR.org, January 15, 2009, 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99422633. 
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subvert traditional checks on presidential power. Ultimately, the dismantling of some of the 
enemy combatant policies and the gradual return of checks and balances in the national security 
sphere, largely based on court rulings that challenged the administration’s premise of power, 
signified a reining in of executive authority. Yet, many important aspects of the administration’s 
counterterrorism and national security apparatus remained past Bush’s years in the White House, 
leaving a legacy of expanded presidential power able to be used by future presidents.  
Chapter Two considers the theory and history of presidential powers, and particularly of 
presidential war powers. I analyze how the Framers understood presidential powers and consider 
competing theoretical claims of presidential power. The chapter then traces a history of 
presidential war powers to explore how different wartime presidents understood their powers and 
the claims they made to exert and expand power. I conclude the chapter by looking at the Unitary 
Executive Theory, a theory of presidential power that many in the Bush administration 
subscribed to, in order to understand how the Bush administration utilized this theory to make 
sweeping claims of executive power and to evaluate the extent to which its claims and actions 
were unprecedented.  
The third chapter considers how the enemy combatant policy was conceived and 
implemented, analyzing the administration’s policies for the detention, treatment, and trial of 
terrorist suspects. I trace the evolution of the policy to understand how it expanded over the 
course of several years. The chapter pays particular attention to the legal reasoning used by the 
administration to defend its policies—one based in ideas of inherent executive power.  
In the fourth chapter, I examine the challenges to the administration’s enemy combatant 
policy. I consider how changes in the make-up of the administration impacted the policies of the 
war on terror. I then look at challenges to the policies in the Supreme Court, focusing on five 
	 8 
enemy combatant cases and how they dismantled aspects of the administration’s policy. In 
studying these cases, I pay particular attention to the legal reasoning used by the government in 
its litigation and its appeals to a theory of broad, inherent presidential power that is discussed in 
the third chapter. Chapter Four also considers the role of Congress in order to understand the 
extent to which Congress was either silent or supportive of the administration and where it 
pushed back.  
 Finally, I conclude by evaluating the significance of the Bush administration’s actions 
and consider what alternative courses of action the president could have taken in its enemy 
combatant policy and broader national security policies. I use the Barack Obama administration 
as a proxy for an administration with a different theory of presidential power to evaluate whether 
a different theory of power might yield a different policy. This example suggests that even with a 
supposedly different theory of presidential power, similar policy outcomes were achieved. 
Lastly, I consider President Donald Trump’s claims to executive power and evaluate the current 
status of enemy combatants. I conclude that presidential power has dramatically increased in the 
years since the September 11 attacks, and it is imperative to the proper functioning of the 




Chapter 2: Theories and History of Presidential Power 
 
This chapter begins the exploration of presidential powers. It starts with the creation of 
the Constitution to understand how the Framers designed the presidency. It then considers 
different theories of presidential powers as advocated for by presidents and scholars. These 
theories are traced through a history of presidential wartime powers to analyze how presidents 
acted during times of war and the claims they made to go beyond their constitutional powers. 
Finally, this chapter concludes by looking at the Unitary Executive Theory, a theory of executive 
power that has had enormous consequences in the last several decades. This theory is 
fundamental to understanding how the Bush administration assumed sweeping powers during the 
war on terror, and most pertinent to this project, how they developed a justification for 
designating captured terrorist suspects as enemy combatants. The administration’s development 
of a theory of presidential power that claimed vast inherent powers for the president sets it apart 
from most of its predecessors and was used time and again in its creation and defense of enemy 
combatant policies. It is through this exploration of history and political theory that we begin to 
unravel a story of expanding powers and broad claims of executive authority. 
 
The Constitution and its Precursors 
 
The role of the modern presidency strays far from the original conception of the 
executive over two centuries ago. As a new nation, the United States of America was the product 
of a revolt against what many colonists considered a tyrannical king. Wary of a tyrannical 
executive and an overreaching central state from the period of British rule, the authors of the 
Articles of Confederation sought to weaken the central government by creating only a legislature 
with limited powers and no executive branch. This first constitution attempted to place power 
	10 
primarily with the thirteen independent, sovereign states, but the nation’s economic troubles 
stemming from the inability of the central state to tax and regulate commerce and the absence of 
a centralized military, among other factors, proved this model to be unsustainable.15 Concerned 
about the ineffectiveness of the Articles, delegates from a collection of states at the 1786 
Annapolis Convention voted to meet in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 to address the 
shortcomings of the document. Though initially called to revise the Articles of Confederation, 
the Philadelphia Convention—which would later come to be known as the Constitutional 
Convention—ultimately led to the drafting of an entirely new constitution—the Constitution of 
the United States.16 
One of the most pressing issues at the Philadelphia Convention was that of executive 
power. The Framers were still fearful of creating a monarchy like that of Great Britain, but the 
weakness of the government under the Articles of Confederation suggested the need for an 
executive branch. Not everyone agreed on what this would look like. Some of the Framers saw 
no use for an executive branch, while others thought executive power should be divided among 
multiple individuals.17 James Wilson of Pennsylvania was the first to propose that there be a 
single executive—a statement that was met with silence from the room.18 Edmund Randolph of 
Virginia objected to this idea and favored instead a plural executive, fearing a single executive 
would be the “foetus of monarchy.”19 Wilson countered that the single executive would in fact be 
the “best safeguard against tyranny.”20 He argued that the American executive would only have 
                                                
15 John P. Burke, Presidential Power: Theories and Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2016), 15. 
16 Savage, Takeover, 14. 
17 Andrew Rudalevige, The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power after Watergate (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2006), 19. 
18 Burke, Presidential Power, 19. 
19 Ibid. 
20 James Madison, “Madison Debates: June 1” (The Avalon Project, Yale Lillian Goldman Law Library, June 1, 
1787), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_601.asp. 
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the power to execute laws and make appointments, unlike the British monarch whose powers 
included those legislative in nature.21 Perhaps the boldest proposal came from Alexander 
Hamilton, who called for an executive who would be an “elective monarch” and serve for life, in 
line with the English model. This proposal was received unfavorably by most of the delegates 
and many historians believe Hamilton deliberately overstated the case for a strong executive to 
make the Virginia Plan of government appear more favorable.22 Ultimately, Wilson prevailed; 
On June 4, seven states voted in favor of the single executive and three (Delaware, Maryland, 
and New York) voted in opposition.23 
After the entire Constitution was approved by the Convention at the end of the summer of 
1787, it was directed to the states, of which nine state legislatures needed to approve the 
document for it to be ratified. During these ratifying conventions, the nature of executive power 
continued to be debated. Two factions soon developed in this process: the Anti-Federalists and 
the Federalists. Led by Patrick Henry, the Anti-Federalists were opposed to the proposed 
Constitution and its more centralized plan of government. Henry was particularly concerned 
about the expansive role of the president, saying that the Constitution had “an awful squinting, it 
squints towards monarchy.”24 Federalists meanwhile defended the Constitution. To publicly 
promote the Constitution and convince state legislatures to ratify it, Hamilton, James Madison, 
and John Jay composed a series of 85 essays under the pseudonym “Publius” that detailed the 
tenets of the document. In the collection, known as The Federalist Papers, Hamilton wrote 
extensively about the role and restrictions of the president. In Federalist 69, he attempted to 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
22 Samuel B. Hoff, “A Bicentennial Assessment of Hamilton’s Energetic Executive,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 
17, no. 4 (1987): 727–28. 
23 Burke, Presidential Power, 7. 
24 Graham G. Dodds, Take Up Your Pen: Unilateral Presidential Directives in American Politics, Democracy, 
Citizenship, and Constitutionalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 47. 
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assuage fears that a president would become monarchical by emphasizing the constraints on 
presidents’ powers and jokingly comparing his power to that of the governor of New York (a 
prominent Anti-Federalist). In Federalist 70, Hamilton wrote that “energy in the Executive” 
promotes good government and is essential to the protection and security of the state. He also 
described the importance of an empowered executive: “A feeble Executive implies a feeble 
execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a 
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.”25 
Hamilton’s view of an energetic yet constrained president in the Federalist Papers was much 
more restrained than his arguments for a monarchical executive in the Constitutional 
Convention. The Federalists succeeded in their campaign and by the end of July 1788, the 
Constitution was ratified by 11 states and the process to form the new government had begun. 
On April 30, 1789, George Washington was inaugurated as the first president of the United 
States of America.  
The Constitution gave the federal government more power than the Articles of 
Confederation did. To prevent abuse of powers, the Framers divided control of the government 
into three branches—the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary—providing each institution 
with the mechanism to check the others. Barely a thousand words long, Article II of the 
Constitution details most of the powers of the president. The first half of Article II outlines the 
process for selecting the president through the electoral college and the second half enumerates 
the powers of the president. The president is the commander in chief of the military and of state 
militias. Presidents can grant pardons and negotiate treaties. They can appoint ambassadors, 
judges, and executive officials, as well as give Congress information about the state of the union. 
                                                
25 Alexander Hamilton, “The Federalist Papers: No. 70” (The Avalon Project, Yale Lillian Goldman Law Library, 
March 18, 1788), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed70.asp. 
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In some cases, they can call Congress back into session. And they can be removed from office 
through impeachment.   
 Most of the powers of the president enumerated in the Constitution are checked by other 
branches. The president has the power to veto legislation, for example, but the veto can be 
overridden by two-thirds of both chambers of the legislature. While the president is commander 
in chief, the Framers gave Congress the power to declare war and raise armies. And to ensure 
that the American president did not hold the expansive power that allowed the British king to 
make and enforce laws, acting as a tyrant, the Framers wrote that the president “shall take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.”26 Within this framework, Congress would enact laws, and 
the president would obey them.   
Given the scope of this paper, war powers as the Framers envisioned them deserve 
special consideration. The British system gave the monarch the power to make war; the Framers 
rejected this idea, arguing that executives went to war for personal glory and enrichment, not for 
the nation’s interests.27 At the Constitutional Convention, only Pierce Butler of South Carolina 
voiced that the President should have the power to make war, saying that the President would not 
do so unless there was mass support.28 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts responded that he "never 
expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive to declare war" and others 
shared a similar sentiment.29 War powers, it was decided, would be given to the legislative 
branch. Charles Pinkney of South Carolina voiced concern that the legislative branch’s 
proceedings would be too slow, imagining that Congress would meet but once a year.30 Madison 
                                                
26 U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 3. 
27 Louis Fisher, “‘War Powers for the 21st Century: The Constitutional Perspective,’” Subcommittee on 




30 Madison, “Madison Debates: June 1.” 
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and Gerry proposed to edit the clause that had initially allowed Congress to “make” war to 
instead permit Congress to “declare” war, thereby “leaving to the Executive the power to repel 
sudden attacks” if Congress could not act fast enough. Their motion carried and Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution states “Congress shall have the power to…declare war” and to 
“make rules concerning captures on land and water.”31 Congress was also given the power to 
authorize military conflicts and to create armies and make rules on how to regulate them. The 
Framers understood this formulation of war powers—a radical break from the British model—as 
protecting the nation against the impulses of a powerful executive. As Wilson said to the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention,  
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in 
the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the 
important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration 
must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this 
circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our interest can draw us 
into war.32 
 
A few years later Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson, “The constitution supposes, what the 
History of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & 
most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl.”33  
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution makes the president “Commander in Chief of the 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States.”34 Scholars disagree over what this title means in practice. 
Constitutional scholar Louis Fisher argues that the commander in chief title was not meant to 
                                                
31 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, clause 10. 
32 James Wilson, "Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention Address.," McMaster, John Bach, and Stone, Frederick D., 
eds, Pennsylvania and the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788 (Lancaster, 1888) 
33 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 2, 1798, http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_11s8.html. 
34 U.S. Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, clause 1. 
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give presidents sole power to initiate war and determine its scope, but rather to preserve civilian 
supremacy over the military. Legal scholar and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in 
the Office of Legal Counsel John Yoo takes a widely different position. Yoo contends that the 
commander in chief clause should be understood as a “continuation of the English and colonial 
tradition in war powers.”35 According to Yoo, commander in chief powers were not simply 
intended to give the President control over military strategy and operations, but actually to 
convey the military powers of the British king, including the ability to go to war; he based this 
conclusion largely in the writings of Hamilton, particularly Federalist 70.36 Regardless, 
presidents have frequently used their commander in chief power to justify unilateral decisions, 
and the courts have generally been hesitant to contradict presidents’ appeal to this power.37 
The Constitution leaves several provisions surrounding the president quite vague, 
allowing for interpretation, especially in Article II. Legal scholar Edward Corwin described 
Article II in 1957 as “the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution.”38 The first sentence of 
Article II vests “the executive power in a president of the United States.” Yet it is not clear what 
“executive power” is. What does this power let presidents do? And are there inherent executive 
powers? During debates on the Bill of Rights, Madison rejected the suggestion that the executive 
be prohibited from exercising powers not “expressly delegated” in the Constitution and said that 
there “must necessarily be admitted powers by implication.”39 This adds to the argument that the 
president, among other actors, has powers that are neither granted nor prohibited by Congress. 
Presidents have interpreted the vague language of Article II strategically to offer implied or 
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inherent powers that have not been explicitly spelled out in the Constitution. In doing so, they 
have claimed powers that extend beyond the narrow ones granted to them in the Constitution, 
expanding the presidency into one of the most powerful offices in the world—an institution that 
today is far from what the Framers had imagined.  
 
 
Theories of Presidential Power 
 
 The vagueness of Article II opens it to interpretation and yields questions about the limits 
to presidential powers. Here, two central theories about presidential power emerge—one taking a 
broad view on presidential authority, reading the Constitution loosely, and the other a more 
strictly constructed interpretation. These theories are exemplified in the early 20th-century debate 
between Theodore Roosevelt and his successor William Howard Taft.  
Roosevelt was an activist president—he took on an expansive reading of presidential 
powers and argued that he could take any action unless it was explicitly forbidden in the 
Constitution. In his autobiography, Roosevelt wrote, “I declined to adopt the view that what was 
imperatively necessary for the Nation could not be done by the President unless he could find 
some specific authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to 
do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the 
Constitution or by the laws.”40 Roosevelt’s approach has been labeled the “stewardship theory,” 
because he defined it as grounded in the service of the nation. To Roosevelt, the president was 
meant to be the "steward" of the people, which is how he understood his own role as president. 
He took actions outside of the conventional purview of the president such as establishing 
national parks without regard for state jurisdiction. “I did not usurp power, but I did greatly 
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broaden the use of executive power. In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I acted for the 
common well-being of all our people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless 
prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition," Roosevelt said.41 
 Taft was troubled by Roosevelt’s conception of the presidency. Unlike Roosevelt, Taft 
believed that the president could not take actions that were not granted or reasonably implied by 
the Constitution, even if they were in the public’s interest. “There is no undefined residuum of 
power which [a president] can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest," he 
said. “The President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some 
specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and 
necessary to its exercise.”42 Taft did not argue that the Constitution could not be interpreted, but 
rather that the president’s actions should follow reasonable constitutional interpretation or 
Congressional approval, or both.43 It is noteworthy that Taft’s actions during his presidency were 
more activist than his philosophy suggests. He issued more executive orders and presidential 
proclamations per year than Roosevelt did and created a 2.7-million-acre wildlife refuge in the 
Aleutian Islands, far larger than any Roosevelt created.44 
 This debate between Roosevelt and Taft establishes a dichotomous understanding of the 
presidency; the former creates an autonomous president with more expansive powers and the 
latter a reined-in president, who more closely follows the Constitution. Presidents and scholars 
both before and after Roosevelt and Taft’s time have debated these theories of presidential 
power. Those who align themselves with Roosevelt’s stewardship theory often cite the 
presidential oath of office in their claim that the Constitution allows for broad powers and a loose 
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interpretation. Found in Article II the oath of office states: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my 
ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”45 The oath contains 
two phrases that many point to as empowering the president. The first is that by requiring the 
president to execute the office of the president, it might allow for actions not specified in the 
Constitution in order to do so. Similarly, the clause calling the president to “preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution” might also be interpreted to permit measures not specified in the 
Constitution in order to ensure the viability of the document.46  
 Scholarship on the presidency often takes on the same questions and theories debated by 
Roosevelt and Taft. Political scientist Edward Corwin supported Roosevelt’s stewardship theory, 
writing that the president “was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in 
the Constitution or imposed by Congress under its constitutional powers.”47 Corwin argued that 
presidents must take action in the public’s interest if Congress fails to act: “If and when Congress 
lacked the constitutional power to do something in the public interest, its deficiency would 
become a mandate to the 'executive power' to do it; nor, obviously, would executive action taken 
on this premise be subject to Congressional control.”48  
 In line with Roosevelt, some scholars believe that the Framers created a president with 
broad rights beyond those enumerated in the Constitution in an effort to create a strong 
executive. Legal scholar Saikrishna Prakash, for example, claims that the office of the president 
was seen as imperial from its conception. Using historical documentation from the Philadelphia 
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Convention and the ratification conventions, Prakash argues that though the Framers were 
concerned about excessive executive power, they still created a strong executive due to fears of 
anarchy and executive sluggishness. It is a misconception, he says, that the founders were so 
afraid of replicating England’s king that they would not create a body that even resembled a 
monarchy.49 
Louis Fisher, meanwhile, argues for a more restricted view of presidential powers, 
aligning with Taft’s view of the presidency. He argues that the president does not have inherent 
powers, as many presidents and scholars would argue, calling it an “illusory claim.”50 Rather, 
Fisher contends that the Framers created express powers (those written in the Constitution) and 
allowed for implied powers, which can be drawn from them. Though some view implied and 
inherent powers as synonymous, Fisher says they are “radically different” as inherent powers are 
not drawn from express powers and are instead unsubstantiated assertions when claimed by a 
president. Fisher believes such claims are dangerous: “The Constitution is undermined by claims 
of open-ended authorities that cannot be located, defined, or circumscribed,” he argues.51 
“Whenever the executive branch justifies its actions on the basis of ‘inherent’ powers, the rule of 
law is jeopardized. To preserve a constitutional system, executive officers must identify express 
or implied powers for their actions.”52 Fisher warns against presidents using inherent powers to 
usurp Congressional war powers. He writes, “Nothing is more destructive to the rule of law than 
allowing Presidents to claim that the Commander in Chief Clause empowers them to initiate war. 
With that single step all other rights, freedoms, and procedural safeguards are diminished and 
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sometimes extinguished.”53 Fisher highlights a central issue of executive power and a fear that 
the Framers seem to have held: what happens when a president claims expansive powers to 
initiate war? And what other claims can they make as a result? The following section of this 
chapter will deal specifically with the issues Fisher warns against, examining claims of 
presidential authority over war powers.  
  
 
A History of Presidential War Powers 
 
 The Roosevelt-Taft debate sets up a broad framework to understand how presidents have 
viewed their powers—broadly, they are either constrained by the boundaries of the Constitution 
or able to take actions as long as those do not overtly conflict with the Constitution. This 
paradigm is both complemented and complicated by the issue of war powers, as it creates a third 
piece to the Roosevelt-Taft dichotomy: the idea of a zone of autonomy. In times of war, 
presidents have claimed greater executive power in the face of an emergency and have even 
suggested that they have exclusive control over the arena of war. This section explores how 
select presidents have understood their wartime powers and the claims they have made to push or 
break the boundaries of constitutionally mandated powers in times of war.  
 
The Federalist Era 
 
 In 1793 at the start of Washington’s second term, war broke out between England and 
France, and the United States was pressed to take sides. Washington chose instead to declare the 
nation neutral in the conflict and his administration issued a Proclamation of Neutrality that 
April. Many members of Washington’s cabinet agreed that neutrality was necessary, fearing that 
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the military was too small to engage in risky conflict. But controversy arose over whether 
Washington was constitutionally permitted to declare neutrality; the power to declare war had 
been given to Congress, so was it within the president’s power to declare neutrality?54  
 These questions started a debate through pamphlets between Hamilton, writing as a 
Federalist, and Madison, writing as a Jeffersonian Democratic-Republican. Under the name 
“Pacificus,” Hamilton wrote a series of essays that defended Washington’s proclamation, 
arguing that while Congress has the power to declare war, it is “the duty of the executive to 
preserve peace till war is declared.”55 At Jefferson’s urging, Madison, writing as “Helvidius,” 
countered that the proclamation was equivalent to a new treaty, and only legislators could make 
laws or ratify treaties. He argued that presidents could not end states of war or declare peace 
without Congress’s consent.56 Madison accused Hamilton and anyone else who supported the 
Neutrality Proclamation of being a monarchist, writing that permitting the president to issue such 
a proclamation would be to take “royal prerogatives from the British government.”57 
 Hamilton’s argument took on a broad claim—he seized the ambiguous first words of 
Article II of the Constitution that “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States” and contrasted it with Article I, which begins “All legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States” to assert that Article II provided a 
general grant of powers to the president whereas Congress was constrained to the enumerated 
powers in Article I.58 The executive, then, could carry out anything the Constitution did not 
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forbid, because, Hamilton asserted, “the executive power of the Union is completely lodged in 
the President.”59 Madison countered that giving the president powers that were not specifically 
enumerated would threaten free government.60 This debate opened up a broader question about 
executive powers: Are presidents limited to the designated powers in the Constitution? Or can 
they take any action not explicitly forbidden in the Constitution? Over various administrations 
throughout history and into the present, these questions continue to be fundamental in 
understanding the institution of the presidency.  
 Many wars in American history include stories of presidents who went beyond their 
constitutional powers, often violating civil liberties in the name of national security. The War of 
1812 is not one of them. By 1814, the White House lay in ashes, the Capitol was badly burnt, 
New England Federalists were contemplating secession, and the country was imperiled. But 
Madison, who had long argued that presidents’ powers were only those enumerated in the 
Constitution, as he did in the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, did not attempt to stretch his 
constitutional powers or exert strong executive action.61 Instead, he showed restraint at a moment 
when there was room for strong claims of presidential wartime powers. Madison biographer 
Ralph Ketcham described his behavior during the war: 
Madison's course [during the War of 1812] was consistent with his theory of republican 
government and especially of the use of executive power. To be imperious, or 
domineering, or grand was to him simply inappropriate in a president who was the agent 
of the people, the follower of Congress in matters of policy, and the creature of the 
Constitution in the definition of his powers. In this sense Madison's conduct of the War 
of 1812, with all its difficulties, indecisiveness, and failures, was an ultimate triumph in 
that republican government emerged confirmed and strengthened.62 
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Not all view Madison’s restraint so favorably. In his book All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties 
in Wartime, former Chief Justice William Rehnquist writes that while the capital was burning, 
“the national government under President James Madison was too weak and inert to abridge 
anyone’s civil liberties.”63 Whether a sign of weakness as Rehnquist claims, or of virtue, 
Madison’s handling of the war illustrates that not every president sought to expand their power 
in times of war.  
 
Era of Expansion 
 
 When James K. Polk ran for president in 1844, he promoted the idea of Manifest Destiny. 
His predecessors had extended the country westward, and Polk too desired to expand the nation. 
As president, Polk wanted to lay claim to the lands around newly-claimed Texas, but Mexico 
held strong. After failing to purchase the land from the Mexican government, Polk sent troops to 
the disputed border area to provoke Mexico into war.64 When Mexican troops fought back 
against American troops who entered Mexican territory, Polk declared that Mexico had invaded 
U.S. territory and “shed American blood upon American soil;” in turn, he asked Congress to 
declare war. 65 In May 1846, Congress did just that.  
The war quickly became a partisan issue exacerbated by rivalries in the regionally 
divided nation. Some, like South Carolina senator John C. Calhoun, worried that the war would 
re-open the contentious issue of slavery in the new territories. Many abolitionists raised issue 
that the war was simply a power-grab by the President—an unjust use of war powers to gain 
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slaveholding land, and many Whigs criticized Polk for exceeding his executive authority.66 Whig 
leader Robert Toombs of Georgia said, “This war is nondescript…We charge the President with 
usurping the war-making power…with seizing a country…which had been for centuries, and was 
then in the possession of the Mexicans. … Let us put a check upon this lust of dominion. We had 
territory enough, Heaven knew.”67 Many also found absurd Polk’s claim that the war started on 
U.S. territory. Then-congressman Abraham Lincoln disputed Polk’s assertion and introduced the 
“Spot Resolution” to call for Polk to submit evidence that blood was shed on American land.68 
Though this resolution did not lead to any results, it highlights the Whigs’ argument that the war 
was not just. On January 3, 1848, the House of Representatives voted to censure Polk for 
“unnecessarily and unconstitutionally” beginning the war.69 Ulysses Grant who served as Second 
Lieutenant in the war would later call it “one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against 
a weaker nation.”70 
Victory in the war gave the United States vast territory, but as Calhoun feared, it also 
intensified divisions between the North and South as questions of slavery in the new territory 
spurred controversy that set the stage for the Civil War.  
 
The Civil War  
 
On April 12, 1861, secessionist rebels attacked Fort Sumter, starting the Civil War. With 
Congress out of session, President Lincoln did not wait for members to return to take action. 
Without Congress’s declaration of war, Lincoln expanded the Union’s army, spent 
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unappropriated money on military supplies, and blockaded Southern ports—measures that went 
beyond his authority under federal law and the Constitution.71 He also suspended habeas corpus 
to hold prisoners without charge or trial—the most controversial of his wartime actions. It was 
unclear whether Lincoln had the authority to do this. The Constitution states, “The privilege of 
the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion 
the public safety may require it.”72 The Framers placed the suspension in Article I, which lays 
out Congressional powers, but did not make clear whether it was Congress or the president that 
had the right to suspend. Chief Justice Roger Taney sided with Congress, deciding in Ex parte 
Merryman in 1861 that Lincoln did not have the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and 
that only Congress had the power to do so—and even then only in the case of emergency.73 
Lincoln ignored Taney and expanded the suspension as far north as Bangor, Maine. In response 
to Taney, Lincoln wrote, “are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself 
to pieces, lest that one be violated?”74  
Lincoln did not attempt to justify his actions as lawful based on a claim of inherent 
powers, but rather on temporary emergency powers. He acknowledged and accepted that he had 
exceeded the constitutional boundaries of the presidency and when Congress reconvened, he 
asked for authorization for his emergency actions because their purpose was to preserve the 
Constitution by preserving the nation.75 His messages to Congress made clear that he did not 
believe these war powers were inherent in the presidency, but instead that he acted quickly in the 
face of emergency. Congress forgave Lincoln’s actions and retroactively made them legal in 
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light of the circumstances. For some scholars, these measures, especially the suspension of 
habeas corpus, are stains on Lincoln’s presidency. But for others, like Benjamin Kleinerman, 
Lincoln’s actions demonstrate how the president should act in an emergency because he 
established no legal precedent and he limited his discretionary executive power.76  
In 1866, a year after the Civil War ended and Lincoln had been assassinated, the Supreme 
Court ruled in Ex parte Milligan that the use of military tribunals to try citizens when civilian 
courts were operating was unconstitutional and held that the Constitution could not be suspended 
out of emergency necessity. “The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all 
times, and under all circumstances,” Justice David Davis wrote for the majority. “No doctrine, 
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of 
its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a 
doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism…”77 In Milligan, the Court showed that it was 
unwilling to permit expansive wartime powers, but the court’s ruling came after the war was 
over and there were no immediate consequences of its decision, after ignoring similar cases 
while the war was ongoing. 
 
World War I 
 
 In 1916, Woodrow Wilson ran for his second term as president on the slogan "He kept us 
out of war!" but just months after his inauguration, mounting German aggression led Wilson to 
ask for Congress to declare war on Germany, which it did two days later. Even before the United 
States entered the war, Wilson was worried about disloyal and subversive actors in the United 
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States. In his 1915 State of the Union Address he declared, "I am sorry to say that the gravest 
threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are 
citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed under our 
generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured 
the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life."78 Wilson urged Congress to 
allow him to take actions against these perceived domestic threats; Congress obliged and 
delegated powers to the president through statute. In 1917, Congress passed the Espionage Act, 
which made "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of Duty, in the military or naval forces" 
illegal.79 A year later, Congress passed the Sedition Act that made it illegal to "willfully utter, 
print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language" about the U.S. 
government, the flag, or the military or that viewed these institutions with contempt.80 These two 
laws gave Wilson vast powers to curb free speech and control published material in the name of 
wartime security. Between 1917 and 1920, nearly 2000 people were convicted under these 
laws.81 Congress repealed the Sedition Act in 1920 but left intact provisions of the Espionage 
Act. In 1917, Congress also gave Wilson the power to oversee or restrict trade between the U.S. 
and enemy countries during times of war and to impose sanctions against foreign nationals and 
foreign countries.82 This gave the president broad executive authority over trade as well as the 
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ability to wage economic warfare during national emergencies.  
 
World War II 
 
Louis Fisher writes that until the 1930s, conflicts between the executive and the 
legislative branches were cyclical—a strong president would be followed by a resurgent 
Congress; the system of checks and balances did their job.83 After each major military conflict 
where the presidency expanded, the balance of power was restored and Congress went back to 
being a co-equal branch of government alongside the presidency. However, according to Fisher, 
the powers that were transferred to President Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Great Depression 
and World War II did not swing back to Congress after these crises subsided and his tenure 
ended.84 Rather, this period witnessed the permanent increase of presidential powers. It is worth 
noting that Fisher’s analysis might overlook previous lasting expansions of the presidency, 
particularly those of the World War I era.  
Roosevelt was clear from the start of his presidency that he would not hesitate to employ 
executive power and expand the power of the federal government to meet the nation’s 
challenges. In the face of the Great Depression, Roosevelt used his first inaugural address to 
encourage hope that the crisis would end. In addition to his famous declaration, “the only thing 
we have to fear is fear itself,” Roosevelt asserted that he would attempt to gain wartime powers 
to tackle the problems. “I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the 
crisis—broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that 
would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe," he stated.85 
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Congress worked with Roosevelt to give him these powers. It passed his New Deal 
legislation, which dramatically expanded the federal bureaucracy to address the nation’s 
economic challenges and gave him wide control over domestic affairs.86 When the Supreme 
Court struck down the laws as unconstitutional, Roosevelt threatened to “pack” the Court with 
additional members to vote as he wanted.87 Congress rejected the court-packing plan, but 
political pressure led the Court to start upholding the New Deal legislation. 
 During World War II, the First and Second War Powers Acts gave Roosevelt enormous 
executive authority in war.88 It allowed for a reorganization of the executive branch, the issuance 
of hundreds of executive orders, and the creation of nearly fifty new agencies.89 But Roosevelt 
also relied on his own unilateral authority as president. In a 1942 speech, Roosevelt signaled his 
willingness to use executive authority with or without congressional approval, saying, “The 
President has the powers, under the Constitution and under Congressional acts, to take measures 
necessary to avert a disaster.”90 He did just that during the war, using a number of executive 
orders to assert his presidential power. One of Roosevelt’s most notorious executive orders 
mandated the forced relocation and internment in concentration camps of more than 120,000 
Japanese Americans who lived on the West Coast—two-thirds of whom were U.S. citizens—in 
response to the Pearl Harbor attack.91 In the executive order, Roosevelt claimed the ability to do 
so based in part on “the authority vested in [him] as President of the United States, and 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.”92 By claiming inherent powers as a product of his 
Commander in Chief title, Roosevelt was able to extend great influence over war-related policy.  
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 In Korematsu v. United States, the court ruled that Roosevelt’s executive order was 
constitutional and that it responded to a public safety risk, a view that Congress too supported, 
thereby affirming Roosevelt’s war powers. The World War II period saw a series of similar cases 
that dealt with presidential war powers where the Court was deferential to the presidency, 
including Ex parte Quirin, and Johnson v. Eisentrager. These cases will be further discussed in 
the next chapter.  
 
The Cold War Era 
 
In 1942 Roosevelt told Congress that he would relinquish his wartime powers after the 
war: “[When] the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the people—
to whom they belong.”93 This was not the case; after the war ended presidential powers did not 
revert to the people or to Congress. Rather, Roosevelt’s successor Harry S. Truman continued to 
use emergency and war powers throughout his presidency.94 Out of World War II emerged the 
Cold War, and Truman, in the face of this new conflict, retained and expanded his powers as 
commander in chief.  
Truman was the first president in American history to claim that his commander in chief 
designation enabled him to take the country to war on his own. In 1950, Truman sent American 
troops to fight North Korea, beginning a war that would last three years and kill thirty-seven 
thousand American service members. No president before him had launched into a war so 
serious without Congressional authorization as constitutionally mandated.95 Not only did Truman 
act without congressional approval, but he also refused a congressional resolution when offered 
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one.96 Truman’s cited a United Nations Security Council resolution as legal authority for this 
action, claiming that the United States’ treaty obligations required the military action.97 Still, 
Fisher denounces these actions as “the single most important precedent for the executive use of 
military force without congressional authority.”98  
Two years later, Truman made an even more controversial decision in the name of 
inherent powers. After a labor dispute in 1952, he seized steel mills to prevent a strike that could 
hurt the Korean War efforts. He claimed that his authority as commander in chief and his 
“inherent” presidential powers allowed him to do so.99 In a six to three vote, the Supreme Court 
struck down Truman’s actions as an unconstitutional usurpation of Congress’s lawmaking 
powers. Writing for the majority in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decision, Justice 
Hugo Black stated, “the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the 
idea that he is to be a lawmaker."100  
Though the steel mill seizure case is an example of the Court curtailing presidential 
power, the trajectory towards an increasingly imperial president remained in motion. The climate 
of permanent emergency during the Cold War meant presidents began to enter large conflicts 
without Congressional declarations and gave presidents an excuse for expansive powers. And the 
emergence and growth of nuclear weapons during the Cold War further contributed to 
centralized executive power as the president could launch a nuclear attack immediately without 
time to consult Congress. When Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in 1969, he inherited an 
office with inflated powers far beyond those of its occupants through most of American history. 
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During his presidency, Nixon grasped for nearly unrestricted presidential powers both in the 
domestic sphere and in foreign policy based on an expansive view of inherent authority.101 At 
home, Nixon attempted to control the bureaucracy, eliminate agencies he opposed, and expand 
White House staff. He invoked executive privilege far more than his predecessors and, of course, 
in what came to be known as the Watergate scandal, he authorized warrantless wiretapping, 
burglaries, and other illegal activities and launched a large (if unsuccessful) cover-up.102  
 Nixon’s broad view of his executive authority is also evident in his foreign policy and 
wartime activity, as he claimed executive authority over national security.103 Nixon took 
unilateral actions in Southeast Asia; in 1970 he secretly ordered bombing campaigns in 
Cambodia to disrupt a North Vietnamese supply route to insurgents in South Vietnam without 
congressional approval and invaded the country to prevent communist control. His actions 
sparked widespread domestic unrest that resulted in protesters being shot and killed at Kent State 
University in Ohio and Jackson State University in Mississippi by National Guard troops and 
police.104 Nixon relied on Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist to defend his actions in 
Cambodia. Rehnquist claimed that the Commander in Chief clause in Article II was a “grant of 
substantive authority,” which, through history, had allowed presidents to send troops “into 
conflict with foreign powers in their own initiative.”105 
 In 1971, Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf resolution to restore limits on presidential 
power, but Nixon continued the war in Vietnam until 1973.106 Like President Lyndon B. Johnson 
before him, Nixon expanded his war powers in the wars in Southeast Asia. But unlike Johnson, 
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Nixon did not advise or consult Congress, but rather used only executive actions. “Nixon cited 
no emergency that denied time for congressional action, expressed no doubt about the perfect 
legality of his personal extension of war into two new countries, and showed no interest even in 
retrospective congressional ratification,” wrote historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. on Nixon’s 
actions in Southeast Asia. “The authority claimed by Nixon appeared indefinitely extensive so 
long as a President could declare American forces anywhere in the world in danger of attack.”107 
Even after the Watergate scandal and his resignation, Nixon held firmly to his expansive 
view of presidential powers. In 1977, three years after he left office, Nixon declared that the 
president “does have certain extraordinary powers which would make acts that would otherwise 
be unlawful, lawful if undertaken for the purpose of preserving the nation and the 
Constitution.”108 In an infamous interview with journalist David Frost, Nixon claimed that 
presidents have the inherent powers to “authorize government officials to break laws if the 
president decides doing so would be in the national interest,” which he said gave him the 
authority to order burglaries, eavesdrop, and carry out other illegal conduct while in office.109 He 
cited Lincoln’s actions during the first months of the Civil War as precedent to argue that 
presidents have the power to break the laws for national security interests. “When the president 
does it, that means that it is not illegal,” Nixon famously asserted in his interview with Frost.110 
When questioned if his rationale would permit the President to order murder, for instance, Nixon 
recoiled and stammered, “There are degrees, there are nuances which are difficult to explain.”111 
This paralleled a line of reasoning used by John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s counsel, in the Watergate 
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hearings; Ehrlichman told the Senate Watergate Committee that as president Nixon had the 
inherent authority to authorize the break-in to Lewis Fielding’s office (Fielding was the 
psychiatrist of Daniel Ellsberg, the leaker of the Pentagon Papers), even if he had not done so.112 
In his seminal 1973 book The Imperial Presidency, Schlesinger wrote about the period of 
incredible unchecked presidential power that peaked during the Nixon administration. He 
popularized the term “imperial presidency” to describe the modern president who exceeded 
constitutional limits and was uncontrollable. Schlesinger wrote in his book that Nixon had 
“effectively liquidated the constitutional command that the power to authorize war belonged to 
Congress.”113 By undermining this constitutional check on presidential power, Nixon “has aimed 
to establish as normal presidential power what previous presidents had regarded as power 
justified only by extreme emergencies and employable only at their own peril,” Schlesinger 
asserted.114 The Vietnam and Nixon eras prompted Congress to pass new laws curbing 
presidential power, including rules that required presidents to consult Congress before deploying 
armed forces into combat and to bring troops home after 60 days unless explicitly authorized by 
Congress. But these checks soon started to erode after Watergate and presidents continued to 
take unilateral decisions using justifications of inherent powers.115 
 Nixon’s career in politics ended when he resigned in 1973, but a young Dick Cheney’s 
was just beginning. In 1969 Cheney had worked for Donald Rumsfeld in the Office for 
Economic Opportunity, where he witnessed first-hand Nixon’s efforts to expand presidential 
power. He followed Rumsfeld to the Cost of Living Council, but when Rumsfeld was appointed 
Nixon’s ambassador to NATO, Cheney left government. He re-entered the political sphere in 
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1974 as Deputy White House Chief of Staff to Nixon’s successor Gerald Ford before being 
promoted to White House Chief of Staff the following year. In this role, Cheney worked to 
protect presidential powers. Twenty-four years later, Cheney would return to the White House, 
this time as Vice President. In that role, he would work to vastly expand the power of the 
president and along with lawyers of the Bush-Cheney administration, he would promulgate a 
theory of the presidency that was not widely known but would have an enormous impact—the 




The Unitary Executive Theory 
 
The Unitary Executive Theory is a set of views about presidential power. It holds that the 
Constitution gives the president exclusive control over all powers that are executive in nature, 
and therefore the president can control everything within the executive branch of the federal 
government.116 Although the Constitution’s treatment of presidential power is both brief and 
vague, and does not explain the president’s relationship with the rest of the executive branch, 
proponents of the theory (called unitarians) argue that the Constitution vests all executive power 
in the president.117 Unitarians look to the “vesting clause” of Article II, which states, “The 
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”118 Unitarians 
understand the words “the executive power” and “a president” to mean that all executive power 
is vested in a single president.119 According to Fisher, “this places all executive power directly 
under the control of the president, leaving no room for independent commissions, independent 
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counsels, congressional involvement in administrative details, or statutory limitations on the 
president's power to remove executive officials.”120 The theory is not so much a claim about the 
scope of presidential power, according to scholar Graham Dodds, but rather “a claim that the 
presidency is the sole repository of executive power.”121 
 Unitarians claim that the theory was a product of America’s founding; The Framers, 
dissatisfied with the inadequate executive in the Articles of Confederation came to a consensus 
in favor of an independent and energetic executive.122 They cite Hamilton, who argued in 
Federalist 70, “The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are, first, unity….”123 
Unitarians often trace the theory back to claims presidents made to exert their power in the early 
years of the republic. Legal scholars Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo, for example, argue 
that all presidents have advanced the Unitary Executive to some degree.124 Others propose 
origins in Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus or Truman’s seizure of steel mills almost a 
century later.125   
Two strands of the Unitary Executive Theory exist. The weaker and more traditional 
strand is represented by those like Calabresi and Yoo, who claim that the president has control 
over executive branch functions.  But the second strand, the more aggressive proponents of the 
theory, use these claims of early origins to take a sweeping view of presidential authority. 
Proponents of the second strand argue that the president has exclusive control over all powers 
executive in nature and that any effort to interfere with the president’s decision-making within 
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the executive branch by the other branches of government violates the Constitution. One such 
advocate is current (as of 2020) Attorney General William Barr who had been an early proponent 
of the theory during his time in the Reagan White House. In a controversial speech to the 
Federalist Society in late 2019, Barr embraced the theory while promoting a maximalist view of 
executive power powers. “This is not ‘new’ and it is not a ‘theory.’ It is a description of what the 
Framers unquestionably did in Article II of the Constitution,” Barr claimed.126  
Critics meanwhile consider this exclusive executive control as more monarchical than 
democratic and understand the more aggressive strand of the theory as an attempt to rewrite 
history. Most legal scholars believe this conception of the presidency deviates from the Framers’ 
vision—after all, the Framers feared monarchy and held a pessimistic view of human nature—
and cite the system of checks and balances as evidence of an effort to prevent the president from 
becoming tyrannical.127 Critics accuse unitarians of cherry-picking statements from the Framers 
to show consensus behind the unitary executive without accurately portraying the debate and 
disagreements in shaping the executive. They argue that the unitarians’ reading of Federalist 70 
is misleading; Hamilton was writing about why the Framers chose a single executive and not a 
committee of executives when he wrote about unity, not that the president should hold war 
powers in place of Congress. Critics also argue that the unitarians’ reading entirely ignores 
Federalist 69, which describes the president’s limited wartime powers.128 And they say 
unitarians ignore the skepticism many voiced in the Constitutional Convention, detailed earlier in 
the chapter, as well as in the ratifying conventions, over the proposal for a single executive.  
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Though proponents claim actions taken by presidents in the first two centuries of U.S. 
history were in accordance with the Unitary Executive Theory, the theory itself originated only 
in the 1980s during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. Dodds emphasizes that the theory was not 
developed by academics to explain presidential behavior or constitutional principles, but rather 
that it was created and utilized for overtly political purposes to promote conservative ideals.129 
He writes, “The theory of the unitary executive came into being in order to provide an ostensibly 
principled rationale and justification for conservatives to stop and reverse the growth of 
government; it was rooted in and motivated by politics, not the Constitution.”130 Reagan used the 
term “unitary executive” a number of times during his two terms in office, mostly as a way to 
work around a Congress resistant to his policies. The theory was promoted by members of 
Reagan’s legal team and in conservative legal circles—notably, the Federalist Society. While 
Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton invoked the theory to a smaller degree, an 
aggressive form of the theory of the unitary executive saw a resurgence during the George W. 
Bush presidency, where it assumed prominence (and controversy) in the administration. 131 The 
Bush administration merged the Unitary Executive Theory’s claim that the president holds all 
executive power with a broad understanding of the scope of that power to create a strong 
president. This idea of the “unitary executive” with vast inherent authority, not only to direct 
executive-branch officials, was used to promote some of the administration’s boldest claims. 
From the start of Bush’s presidency, strengthening executive power was on the agenda. 
Days after Bush’s inauguration, members of the Bush-Cheney legal team gathered in the office 
of their new boss, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, formerly an Associate Justice of the 
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Texas Supreme Court. Gonzales told the team that Bush had given them two mandates: the first 
was to quickly push conservative judicial nominations through the confirmation pipeline and the 
second was to take advantage of openings to expand and protect presidential power. Bush saw 
the institution of the presidency as weakened by his predecessors, especially Clinton, and wanted 
at the end of his tenure to leave behind a strong presidency.  
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks proved to be a pivotal turning point in Bush’s 
presidency and the nation’s history. On the morning of September 11, two airplanes bound from 
Boston to Los Angeles were hijacked and flown into the north and south towers of the World 
Trade Center. Less than an hour later, a third plane hit the west side of the Pentagon and a fourth 
heading towards Washington, D.C. crashed into a field in Pennsylvania after passengers 
attempted to stop the hijackers. A total of 2,977 people were killed in the immediate impact of 
coordinated attacks, and thousands more injured, in what is the deadliest terrorist attack in world 
history.132 The attacks were met with shock and panic as speculations swirled and further attacks 
were feared. In the following days it became clear that the nineteen hijackers were connected to 
al Qaeda. 
The national fear and despair borne from the attacks gave Bush the leeway to strengthen 
his office. Concerns over protecting national security allowed for a range of executive claims 
that otherwise would not have been possible to make. In the aftermath of the attacks, the Bush 
administration greatly expanded presidential powers that the other branches of government 
largely failed to constrain. On September 14, Bush proclaimed a state of national emergency. 
That same day, Congress approved the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), 
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deciding that the country would go to war. With a 98-0 vote in the Senate and a 420-1 vote in the 
House of Representatives, Congress authorized the president to “use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”133 Though more 
restrained than the draft the White House presented to Congress, the 60 words of the resolution 
allowed Bush to launch the war on terror and granted him great discretionary authority and 
expansive presidential war powers.  
Despite this grant of broad powers, the administration’s legal team went to work to grasp 
even more power than Congress had granted. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), which is 
housed in the Justice Department and advises the executive branch on the lawfulness of proposed 
actions, was the leading architect of the president’s legal strategy in the war on terror. The Bush 
administration, particularly Vice President Dick Cheney, utilized the OLC to give the president 
legal cover for a broad range of actions; as such, this small but powerful office becomes an 
important actor in the war on terror and in this study. Led by John Yoo, the OLC crafted a secret 
memo describing the president’s war powers—the document was completed on September 25, 
2001, but would remain a secret for over three years. In the memo, Yoo wrote that “the 
President's powers include inherent executive powers that are unenumerated in the 
Constitution.”134 Drawing on the theory of the unitary executive, Yoo wrote that Bush did not 
need Congress’s approval, and he could instead use military force as he saw fit because he alone 
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claimed executive power. “Congress has recognized the President's authority to use force in 
circumstances such as those created by the September 11 incidents. Neither statute, however, can 
place any limits on the President's determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of 
military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response. These 
decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President alone to make,” Yoo concluded.135 
The Bush administration frequently employed rationales like this one based in the 
Unitary Executive Theory, often in the form of secret memos, to justify its expansive presidential 
powers. It took the Unitary Executive Theory idea that the president had control over all powers 
executive in nature and applied it to the idea that as commander in chief, the president had 
inherent authority over national security issues, to essentially put the president out of the reach of 
the law. From its signing statements to removal powers, Bush’s legal team invoked the unitary 
executive to assert greater control over politics and policy. And unlike previous presidents, Bush 
extended the theory from the domestic sphere to foreign policy and national security.136 Under 
Bush, the OLC worked to authorize the use of torture, permit warrantless wiretapping, and hold 
U.S. citizens without trial as “enemy combatants” all in the name of the unitary executive. In 
doing so, Bush’s legal team radically altered the scope of the president, leading journalist Charlie 
Savage to write, “With a revolutionary one-two-punch, they eliminated nearly all the checks and 
balances that have been traditionally understood to limit the power of the president.”137  
By the start of the Barack Obama presidency, the theory of the unitary executive had 
become tied to an unpopular president with expansive powers. During his campaign, Obama 
criticized Bush’s unilateral actions and after the election, Vice President-elect Joe Biden said he 
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disagreed with Cheney’s embrace of the unitary executive saying, “His notion of the unitary 
executive, meaning that in time of war essentially all power goes to the executive, I think is dead 
wrong. I think it was mistaken.”138 Though Obama did not advocate for the theory of the unitary 
executive, he took actions that were unitary in their nature. He issued several signing statements, 
took major executive actions when Congress failed to act, and invoked executive privilege.139 So 
while the Obama administration did not make claims of unitary executive powers, some actions 
the administration took showed vestiges of the doctrine Bush put forth.  
The Donald Trump presidency has seen a resurgence of ideas surrounding the unitary 
executive. In both directly citing its tenets and employing its principles to promote a view of 
expansive executive power, the Trump administration has shown an affinity for the unitary 
executive. Trump has repeatedly cited his inherent power as executive and used similar tactics to 
Bush, including employing signing statements, to put forth a bold vision of executive power.140 
And as previously mentioned, Trump’s Attorney General, William Barr, is a longtime proponent 
of the theory, after working to develop it during the Reagan and Bush Sr. presidencies. I return to 
this discussion of the Obama and Trump presidencies in the concluding chapter.   
One of the most important claims the Bush administration made using the Unitary 
Executive Theory was that as commander in chief during a time of war, the president was able to 
designate terrorist suspects, citizens and noncitizens alike, as enemy combatants. This 
designation denied suspects captured in the war on terror prisoner-of-war status and legal 
protections under international law. The administration found justification in Ex parte Quirin, a 
World War II-era case that upheld the president’s use of military tribunals rather than civilian 
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courts to try Nazi saboteurs (this case will be covered in more detail in the following chapter). 
This allowed the administration to justify the indefinite detention of terrorism suspects without 
due process—a justification that would prove contentious and dangerous. It would open the 
doors to debates over national security and civil liberties, and it would spur broad, fundamental 
arguments over detention policy, war powers, constitutional meaning, and the nature of 
presidential powers.  
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Chapter 3: Creating Enemy Combatants 
 
When José Padilla boarded an airplane in Switzerland bound for Chicago’s O’Hare 
International Airport on May 8, 2002, he did not know that FBI agents had secretly followed him 
and that more were waiting to immediately arrest him when he landed. The thirty-one-year-old 
was initially arrested for being a “material witness” to a terrorism investigation but a month later, 
just two days before his scheduled hearing, President George W. Bush signed an order that 
designated him an “enemy combatant” and transferred Padilla from civilian authority to a 
military brig in South Carolina.141 That day, Attorney General John Ashcroft left meetings 
during his trip to Moscow in a rush to personally announce that Padilla was an “al-Qaeda 
operative” whose arrest “disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by 
exploding a radioactive dirty bomb."142 This high-profile announcement turned out to be a 
blunder. Bush aides were surprised that Ashcroft had attempted to take credit for Padilla’s arrest 
and overstated the role of the low-level al Qaeda scout.143 The White House soon released a less 
alarmist statement which explained that Padilla was actually only in the planning stages of a 
plot.144  
While Ashcroft’s statement gained attention for its ominous tone, less notice was paid to 
the astounding legal precedent that had been established. Padilla was an American citizen, born 
and raised in the U.S., and had been captured not on a battlefield but by civilian authorities in the 
United States. By naming Padilla an enemy combatant, the administration signaled that it had the 
authority to detain him indefinitely without charge or trial or access to a lawyer. If the president 
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had the power to hold Padilla as an enemy combatant, he could do the same to any other 
American citizen. 
How did an American citizen arrested on U.S. soil by civilian law-enforcement become 
designated an enemy combatant? And on what authority did the president claim he had the 
power to imprison a U.S. citizen indefinitely without legal process, access to counsel, or judicial 
review? This chapter looks into these questions to understand how the enemy combatant policy 
was conceived and implemented. Padilla’s story represents the most controversial and extreme 
use of the enemy combatant designation and the broadest claim to presidential power, but the 
enemy combatant policy originated in broader claims about how those fighting against the 
United States in Afghanistan should be treated. 
 
Responding to Crisis 
 
The response to the September 11 attacks was swift and multifaceted. Starting on 
September 11, Immigration and Naturalization Service agents worked with the FBI to arrest and 
detain hundreds of noncitizens, mostly Muslims, who were suspected to have ties to the attacks 
or to terrorist organizations. In the two months following the attacks, over one thousand people 
were detained in connection to an investigation for immigration offenses. 145  The Justice 
Department’s Inspector General issued a report in 2003 that criticized the roundup of immigrants 
and said that there was little or no evidence tying those detained to terrorist activity and that 
little-to-no effort was made to distinguish genuine suspects from those with minor visa 
violations.146 Still, the government defended its aggressive response as warranted given the 
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As previously mentioned, just three days after the attacks, a nearly unanimous Congress 
voted to authorize the use of military force against those who had “planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or who "harbored such organizations or persons, in 
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States."147 This 
authorization, known as the AUMF, gave the president broad discretionary authority in the fight 
against terrorism. Bush declared the war on terror in a Joint Session of Congress on September 
20, 2001, stating, “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that 
supports them. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end 
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”148 Bush warned 
lawmakers and the public to expect a “lengthy campaign.”149  
In the same speech, Bush outlined new organizational structures to tighten homeland 
security. He announced the creation of the Office of Homeland Security, led by former 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge in a new cabinet-level position, which would coordinate over 
40 federal agencies as part of the executive branch’s national security efforts.150 The office 
would be at the center of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created by Congress 
in November 2002. And within months of the attacks, Congress authorized the creation of the 
Transportation Security Administration in response to the failings of private airport security 
operations.151  
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In late October, Bush signed into law the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act or USA 
PATRIOT Act (commonly known as the “Patriot Act”). The legislation aided law enforcement in 
detecting and preventing terrorism by facilitating information sharing between government 
agencies, lifting restrictions on surveillance, broadening the definition of terrorism, and giving 
the federal government new powers to track money connected to terrorist organizations, among 
other measures.152 The Patriot Act exemplifies the view of broad governmental action that the 
Bush administration endorsed as its only means to combat terrorism. 
Vice President Dick Cheney appeared on NBC’s Meet the Press a few days after 
September 11, where he explained that in responding to the attacks, the United States would 
have to work on the “dark side” to deal with the threat of terrorism. “We're going to spend time 
in the shadows in the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be 
done quietly, without any discussions, using sources and methods that are available to our 
intelligence agencies if we're going to be successful. That's the world these folks operate in. And 
so it's going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our 
objective,” Cheney explained.153 This statement captured Cheney’s, and much of the 
administration’s, view of the post-9/11 world.  In the months following the attacks, the 
administration adopted many unprecedented, sweeping measures to combat terrorism. It 
developed an extensive surveillance program, created an offshore prison at Guantánamo Bay, 
and opened “black sites” overseas to imprison, and in some cases torture, detainees.154 
Many have argued that the counterterrorism actions taken in response to the September 
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11 attacks show the Bush administration’s broad scope of executive power, one that is 
exemplified in Cheney’s turn to the “dark side”—using any means necessary to fight the terrorist 
threat. But it was not only the administration’s scope of presidential power that was 
unprecedented in the administration’s response to the September 11 attacks, but also the source it 
claimed for this power. The question of the scope of presidential powers is distinct from the 
question of authority. It is, after all, possible to believe that the president should have broad 
powers and leeway to fight terrorism without believing that these powers come from the inherent 
nature of the presidency. For instance, one could argue that the president should have broad 
authority to fight al Qaeda, but believe that this authority must be granted by Congress. I argue 
that the enemy combatant policy, from its conception to its implementation, is a product of both 
a broad scope of executive power as well as of an administration that frequently bypassed 
traditional avenues of acquiring presidential power to claim that these powers flow from inherent 
presidential authority.  
 
A New Kind of War 
 
From the start of the conflict, the White House made clear that the U.S. was engaging in a 
“new kind of war” and that al Qaeda was “a different kind of enemy.”155 “Our war on terror will 
be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past,” Bush said in a radio address 
two weeks after the attack. “This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan. 
Some victories will be won outside of public view, in tragedies avoided and threats eliminated. 
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Other victories will be clear to all.”156 A couple of days earlier Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld relayed a similar message in an op-ed in The New York Times. “Forget about ‘exit 
strategies,’” Rumsfeld wrote. “We're looking at a sustained engagement that carries no deadlines. 
We have no fixed rules about how to deploy our troops; we'll instead establish guidelines to 
determine whether military force is the best way to achieve a given objective.”157 The lack of 
exit strategy would become a central criticism of Bush’s war on terror.  
The United States, along with the United Kingdom, began military operations—named 
Operation Enduring Freedom—in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, with air strikes against 
Taliban militia units and al Qaeda training camps.158 The military action aimed to overthrow the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, after its leader, Mullah Omar, refused to hand over bin Laden. 
The same day, Bush sent a letter to Congress notifying them of the military action. In it, he does 
not cite the AUMF as the basis of his power to order troops into combat, but rather his own 
executive power. “I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct 
U.S.  foreign relations as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive,” he wrote.159 This claim to 
power was established in a secret opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel, detailed in the 
previous chapter, which determined that the use of military power in response to the September 
11 attacks was a decision “for the President alone to make.”160 
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A few weeks later, American ground troops arrived in Afghanistan and partnered with the 
Northern Alliance, non-Pashtun, anti-Taliban forces, to advance on the Taliban.161 Over the next 
month, the U.S. and its allies captured Taliban strongholds, and by December, the Taliban was 
defeated but both Omar and bin Laden escaped capture.162 Bush announced successful military 
action in his State of the Union address in January 2002, declaring, “we are winning the war on 
terror.” But he made clear that the war had only just started: “What we have found in 
Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning.”163  
As war continued in Afghanistan and the military captured suspected terrorists, a host of 
new questions were raised: How should the captured prisoners be classified? Where should they 
be held? How should they be treated? And should they be put on trial? The remainder of this 
chapter details how the administration answered these questions and the ways in which it relied 
on an expansive view of inherent presidential power to make sweeping decisions.  
 
Designating Enemy Combatants 
 
 To determine how to handle terrorist suspects captured in the war, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell appointed his aide Pierre-Richard Prosper, the State Department’s ambassador at 
large for war crimes, to lead an interagency group tasked with making recommendations on the 
legal process for dealing with the detainees. The group was comprised of lawyers and staffers 
across government agencies, and they addressed issues of how to prosecute prisoners, what to 
prosecute them for, and where they would be detained.164 Justice Department prosecutors 
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favored bringing the suspects to trial at civilian federal courts, as had been done after the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing, but this posed a security risk and restricted the kinds of evidence 
that could be used. The military lawyers wanted to use courts-martial, which could take place 
anywhere, but that too required high standards of evidence. A third option was to create a 
military commissions system, but some of the lawyers argued that the president would have to 
get congressional authorization to do so.165  
Prosper’s group moved slowly and some at the White House grew impatient and wanted 
to make those decisions on their own. After a group of White House lawyers, unbeknownst to 
Prosper, decided upon the military commissions route, they drafted an order that argued that the 
president had the inherent wartime power to create military commissions.166 Interestingly, it was 
current Attorney General William Barr, who had led the OLC and served as attorney general 
during the first Bush presidency, who pushed for the use of military commissions to try the 
suspects of the September 11 attack. As the then-head of the OLC, Barr had conceived of the 
idea as a way to try suspects of the 1988 Lockerbie Bombings. Though his plan was unpopular 
then, Barr suggested the idea again after the 9/11 attacks. This time, it gained support.167 In the 
OLC in 2001, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin helped pave the way for 
military commissions; in his November 6, 2001 memo, Philbin wrote that Bush did not need 
approval from the courts or Congress to create military commissions.168 Cheney deliberately 
bypassed many in the White House and Cabinet and brought the order written by the group of 
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White House lawyers straight to Bush, who signed it despite Attorney General John Ashcroft’s 
dissent and without consulting Congress or informing Prosper, Powell, or National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice.169  
Bush’s November 13, 2001, Military Order titled “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War on Terrorism” established that non-US citizens designated by 
the president as suspected terrorists or aiding terrorists who had conspired against the U.S. would 
be detained and subject to trial by military commission.170 While the order gave Bush the sole 
discretionary authority to determine who is a suspected terrorist, the Department of Defense, led 
by Donald Rumsfeld, would be responsible for detaining and trying the suspects. According to 
the order, no court would have jurisdiction to hear an appeal. The plan was not very detailed and 
the specifics of where suspects would be detained and the conditions of detention were still left 
to be decided, but it represented a bold sidelining of Congress and agencies within the executive 
branch and a dramatic appeal to executive authority.  
Though the order did not specifically use the term, it created a new category of people—
later known as enemy combatants—one that would be broadened piece by piece from 
noncitizens captured in fighting in Afghanistan to include U.S. citizens and those captured far 
from the battlefield. Because the captured combatants were not fighting for a state or in uniform, 
the administration contended that they were not covered by the laws of war. The administration 
began to use the “enemy combatant” terminology in early 2002 to refer to the detainees 
designated by the president under the November military order.  
The term “enemy combatant” is not defined in a law or treaty, and many have argued that 
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it mixes multiple legal terms and military concepts to create a nebulous class of persons.171 
Though the phrase combines different terms used to categorize those in war—namely 
“combatant,” “enemy prisoner or war,” and “civilian combatant”—it was simply the term the 
administration used to describe those captured in the war on terror who were not conventional 
prisoners of war.172  
A basic understanding of the laws of war is useful to understanding the legal status of 
enemy combatants. In traditional warfare there is a distinction between civilians and combatants; 
put simply, combatants belong to armed forces or have a direct part in military action and 
civilians do not.173 It should be noted that guerilla or unconventional warfare blurs this 
distinction, making it harder to determine who qualifies as a civilian and who a combatant. 
Within the combatant category exist lawful combatants (recognized in international laws of war) 
and unlawful combatants (not recognized in international laws of war). Lawful combatants meet 
four criteria set in the 1949 Geneva Convention: they are “commanded by a person responsible 
for his subordinates,” “have a fixed distinctive sign,” carry “arms openly,” and conduct 
“operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.”174 Lawful combatants are 
authorized to use force in the conflict and are legitimate military targets. They have combatant 
immunity, which is to say that they cannot be punished for their involvement in the war as long 
as they followed the laws of war, and they are entitled to enemy prisoner of war status as set 
forth by the Geneva Conventions and can be imprisoned (non-punitively) until the end of 
hostilities.175 Unlawful combatants (also called irregular fighters), on the other hand, are not 
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recognized under international law, including the Geneva Conventions, but have historically 
been recognized in military protocol and case law as being distinct from lawful combatants. 
Unlawful combatants are not entitled to prisoner of war status nor do they have combatant 
immunity, and their participation in conflict is considered a violation of the rules of war.176  
The Bush administration asserted that suspected terrorists with al Qaeda or Taliban 
connections captured in the war on terror fit into the unlawful combatant category, and called 
those suspects “enemy combatants.” This group fell between the internationally recognized 
“civilian” and “combatant,” into a third legal category of people. And as will be discussed in 
greater detail, calling them enemy combatants allowed the administration to contend that Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to the detainees. 
In using the nomenclature, the administration’s legal team appealed to a little-cited 1942 
Supreme Court case, Ex parte Quirin, which concluded that eight Nazi spies (including two U.S. 
citizens) who were captured in the U.S. without uniform and with intent to sabotage were 
“unlawful enemy combatants” or “enemy belligerents” and could be tried in a military tribunal 
established by President Roosevelt. In an argument later used during the Bush administration for 
military tribunals, the prosecutors in Quirin contended that the nature of war had changed and 
that the nation’s laws had to adapt to modern circumstances. “Wars today are fought on the total 
front on the battlefields of joined armies, on the battlefields of production, and on the battlefields 
of transportation and morale, by bombing, the sinking of ships, sabotage, spying, and 
propaganda,” they argued.177 For the president to fulfill his oath of office, he has “the clear duty 
to meet force with force and to exercise his military authority to provide a speedy, certain and 
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adequate answer, long prescribed by the law of war, to this attack on the safety of the United 
States by invading belligerent enemies.”178 The Court found that the conspirators were unlawful 
enemy combatants because they violated the law of war and found that Congress had authorized 
the military commissions under its articles of war, and as such Roosevelt did not exceed his 
power. The Court declined to consider whether the president’s commander in chief powers gave 
him the ability to create military commissions without Congressional legislation.179 
Bush largely based his November 2001 military order, which authorized the 
establishment of military commissions, on the case and later invoked it when litigating several 
enemy combatant cases in court. The administration’s embrace of Quirin as justification for their 
treatment of terrorist suspects was met with criticism. Leading scholars of constitutional law 
have called Quirin “shameful,” and an “embarrassing tale.”180 And many dispute the validity of 
Quirin as the basis for the designation and use of tribunals for captured suspects. A report by the 
American Bar Association concluded that Quirin “does not stand for the proposition that 
detainees may be held incommunicado and denied access to counsel; the defendants in Quirin 
were able to seek review and they were represented by counsel,” and as such, it argued that 
enemy combatants should have a similar right to review and access to counsel.181 Further, since 
the Quirin decision in 1942, there had been significant changes to the laws of war, both with the 
creation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) by Congress, which stipulated that 
military commissions had to abide by the same defendant rights and procedures as troops receive 
in courts-martial, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which established that wartime prisoners 
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had the right to a fair trial.182 By relying on Quirin, the administration overlooked both the act of 
Congress and the international treaty. 
 
A Small Legal Office with Immense Power 
The role of the Office of Legal Counsel in helping create and defend the enemy 
combatant policies cannot be overstated. As noted in Chapter One, the OLC is an office in the 
Department of Justice and serves as a legal advisor to the executive branch, including the 
president. Advisory opinions by the OLC are binding, and other executive branch agencies are 
required to follow them. In my interview with Martin Lederman, who worked in the OLC from 
1994 to 2002 and then was its deputy from 2009 to 2010, he explained that ordinarily, the OLC 
is asked to evaluate the legality of a proposed action and offers its advice. “The ordinary course 
of OLC is, someone—the president, the Attorney General, the agency—comes to you and asks… 
‘We're planning on doing this. Is this okay? We only have two hours. You have to give us your 
preliminary advice,’” Lederman said. “But sometimes it ends up being the sort of thing that OLC 
is going to do quite a bit of work on to figure out what the right answer is, which sometimes 
results in a formal written opinion, other times might end up in a more informal memo, or the 
like. This oftentimes results in the question change or OLC pushing on the evidence sufficiently 
that in the end, the agency says ‘if that's what it takes, never mind’ or ‘we'll do it differently.’”183  
But the OLC’s work is not always so independent from the body asking for a legal 
opinion. Because OLC opinions are binding, if an executive branch actor wants to take an action 
with questionable legality, it can ask the OLC for an opinion justifying the action to provide 
legal cover. Lederman explained, “It's also problem-solving with an eye toward legal limits. 
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How do you accomplish what you want to accomplish in a way that the law permits and is safe 
within the law?”184  
After September 11, the OLC, and especially its deputy John Yoo, worked with the Bush 
administration’s lawyers to create a legal framework for dealing with the war on terror. This 
framework gave the president broad powers to fight terrorism and create a system of policies for 
the captured enemy combatants.   
 
Expanding the Designation 
 
 At first, following Bush’s November 2001 military order, the enemy combatant 
designation applied to non-U.S. citizens captured in the war in Afghanistan. From the start, the 
president claimed the exclusive power to apply this designation. A March 2002 OLC memo 
written by Yoo and signed by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee states, “As the President 
possess the Commander-in-Chief and Executive powers alone, Congress cannot constitutionally 
restrict or regulate the President's decision to commence hostilities or to direct the military, once 
engaged. This would include not just battlefield tactics, but also the disposition of captured 
enemy combatants.”185 But when two American citizens—John Walker Lindh and Yaser 
Hamdi—were captured in Afghanistan, the system faced a new challenge and a new question: 
could U.S. citizens be enemy combatants? Lindh, who became infamous as the “American 
Taliban,” was captured in 2001 after fighting with the Taliban; he was threatened with enemy 
combatant status and charges of treason but instead was transferred to the civilian criminal 
justice system.186 But with Hamdi, the answer was yes. Hamdi was captured in November 2001 
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by the Northern Alliance and transferred to U.S. custody. The U.S. believed him to be a Saudi 
citizen and a member of al Qaeda and detained him at Guantánamo Bay. Interrogators quickly 
realized that he was actually a U.S. citizen who had moved to Saudi Arabia at a young age; upon 
discovery of his American citizenship, the administration transferred him to a naval brig, where 
he was held as an enemy combatant for nearly three years without charge.187 Hamdi was a 
“classic battlefield detainee,” the administration argued, and “the Executive's determination that 
an individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, especially when it 
comes to an individual, like Hamdi, captured in an active combat zone.”188 The administration 
thus made the extraordinary claim that the president had the inherent authority as commander in 
chief to selectively detain U.S. citizens indefinitely without trial by designating them as enemy 
combatants. 
 Until mid-2002, the enemy combatant designation had only been given to those captured 
on the battlefield—first to noncitizens then to a handful of citizens, like Hamdi, as well. But 
when José Padilla was arrested in O’Hare airport on his way back from Pakistan, this too 
changed. The New York native was detained as a “material witness” to a dirty bomb plot against 
American targets, far from the battlefields in Afghanistan. Just days before his scheduled hearing 
in a criminal court, where the government would have to charge or release him, Bush designated 
Padilla as an enemy combatant and he was transferred to military custody.189 The administration 
appealed again to the president’s commander in chief power, claiming that it gave him the 
authority to direct the military to protect the nation against al Qaeda both at home and abroad.190 
                                                
187 Ibid. 
188 Theodore Olson, Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/osg/brief/hamid-v-rumsfeld-response 
189 Schwarz Jr. and Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced, 145. 
190 Jay S. Bybee to the Attorney General, "Determination of Enemy Belligerency and Military Detention" (official 
memorandum: Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, June 8, 2002). 8-9. 
	59 
“Detaining al Qaeda operatives who attempt to enter the United States to attack military or 
civilian targets is part of our ongoing military operations in this international armed conflict,” 
wrote Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee in a memo to the Attorney General. 191 By 
confirming that Padilla (and those in similar circumstances) had to be handled as a military 
matter, Bybee claimed that the president could unilaterally direct the detention of American 
citizens working with al Qaeda to harm the United States. Here too the administration made a 
bold claim to executive power by asserting that Bush had the inherent authority to remove a 
defendant—in this case a citizen captured within the United States, away from the military 
conflict—from the judicial process by designating them as an enemy combatant. Both Padilla 
and Hamdi would bring their cases all the way to the Supreme Court to challenge this use of 
executive power. These challenges to enemy combatant policy will be covered in the following 
chapter.  
 In a 2004 order, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz defined enemy combatants 
for the purpose of detention at Guantánamo as “an individual who was part of or 
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners” including “any person who has committed a 
belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.”192 Justice 
Department Lawyer Brian Boyle admitted when questioned in court that this definition was so 
broad as to give it the power to designate even a “little old lady from Switzerland” as an enemy 
combatant if she gave money to a charity without knowing that her money would be funneled it 
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to al Qaeda.193 What started as the president’s authority to designate and detain noncitizens 
fighting directly in the battlefields in Afghanistan against the U.S. as enemy combatants thus 
broadened piece by piece to be wide enough to include citizens and noncitizens alike indirectly 
related to the war on terror. 
 
 
Detention and Treatment of Enemy Combatants 
 
 
“The Least Worst Place” 
 
After the enemy combatant status had been created and Bush’s November 2001 military 
order called for their detention and trial by military commission, the next question the 
government had to answer was where to keep the captured fighters—a decision that Bush had 
ultimately left up to the Defense Department led by Rumsfeld. In November 2001, the Northern 
Alliance had captured around 300 al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in the battle of Mazar-e-Sharif. 
After a prisoner uprising killed a CIA agent who had been questioning them and led to a firefight 
to regain control of the prison that left over 200 of the prisoners dead, commander of the U.S. 
Army forces in Afghanistan General Tommy Frank asked to move the surviving detainees and 
other prisoners out of the war zone to avoid being a target for insurgent attacks.194 Finding a 
place to move the prisoners became the urgent task of Ambassador Prosper’s working group, 
which had originally been created to develop a plan for trying terrorists.  
The group decided that placing the detainees in a prison in the territorial United States 
would pose a security risk and would be politically unpopular.195 They considered other options 
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like a U.S. military base in Germany and those in U.S. territories like Guam and the Marshall 
Islands, but each option had the possibility of interference from the host. During the discussion, 
someone in the group suggested Guantánamo.196   
This option was promising. The United States had leased its naval base at Guantánamo 
Bay from Cuba since 1903, and in the 1990s, it had been used as a refugee camp for Haitians and 
Cubans seeking asylum in the United States.197 It was outside of the territorial United States but 
not under the control of another government.198 Before Prosper’s group could finish considering 
the pros and cons of detaining captured fighters at Guantánamo, their work was once again cut 
short; Rumsfeld decided that Guantánamo was the right decision.199 On December 27, Rumsfeld 
announced the decision to open a detention center at Guantánamo Bay in a press conference. 
Defending the administration’s choice of Guantánamo, Rumsfeld called it “the least worst place” 
to send detainees.200  
There were also several advantages to choosing Guantánamo that the administration 
made discreet. The day after Rumsfeld’s press conference, Philbin and Yoo signed a secret 
Office of Legal Counsel memo that described the legal benefit of detaining prisoners at 
Guantánamo. Despite hesitation that the argument might not hold up in court, they argued that 
although the lease agreement with Cuba gave the United States "complete jurisdiction and 
control" of Guantánamo, the naval base was outside U.S. territory and under Cuban sovereignty, 
so U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over what happened there and neither did Cuban courts.201 This 
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meant that detainees would not be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to challenge their detention 
in U.S. courts. Guantánamo was thus, as one administration official remarked, “the legal 
equivalent of outer space.”202  
On January 11, 2002, the first 20 detainees arrived at Camp X-Ray at Guantánamo, 
wearing orange jumpsuits and black-out goggles. At its height, the population of the detention 
facility rose to nearly 800 detainees as young as 13 and as old as 90 from 59 countries.203 Today 
40 detainees remain, many of whom will likely remain there for the rest of their lives.204 The 
reasons for this will be discussed in Chapter Five.    
 
Evading the Geneva Conventions 
 
 On November 14, 2001, the day after Bush signed the military order calling for the 
detention and trial by military commission of enemy combatants, Cheney told a U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce audience that terrorist suspects do not “deserve to be treated as prisoners of war” 
protected by the Geneva Conventions. But the president had not yet made that decision.205 This 
led to major conflict within the executive branch over whether the Geneva Conventions would 
apply to members of the Taliban and al Qaeda captured on the battlefields. It spurred a series of 
secret opinions by the OLC, which would only begin to be revealed over two years later, that 
used arguments of executive power to give the administration cover to evade the Geneva 
Conventions.    
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 The Geneva Conventions, which were enacted in 1949, set standards for armed conflict 
and established laws for the treatment of captured soldiers in war, named “Prisoners of War.” 
Among other measures, the Geneva Conventions call for the humane treatment of all those 
captured in war, whether they are POWs or not, and give all detainees the right to a hearing to 
determine their status. President Truman signed onto the treaties in 1949 and the Senate ratified 
them six years later. 
The Bush administration worked to loosen this restriction on presidential power. Days 
before the first detainees arrived at Guantánamo, Yoo and another OLC lawyer, Robert 
Delahunty, drafted a secret memo stating that the president had the executive authority to 
suspend the Geneva Conventions in the war in Afghanistan and that Taliban and al Qaeda 
soldiers did not qualify as Prisoners of War under the Third Geneva Convention. Those detained 
as enemy combatants at Guantánamo were thus not protected by the Geneva Conventions. The 
memo took steps to resist potential congressional checks on the president’s national security 
power. Yoo and Delahunty wrote that the commander in chief power gave the president “plenary 
control over the conduct of foreign relations,” and any effort by Congress to restrict the 
president’s authority to suspend the Geneva Conventions “would represent a possible 
infringement on presidential discretion to direct the military.”206 On January 25, Gonzales signed 
a memo to Bush (it was later revealed that the memo had been ghostwritten by David Addington) 
reaffirming Yoo and Delahunty’s memo and told Bush that as president, he had the 
“constitutional authority” to assert that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to those captured 
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in the war on terror.207 “As you have said, the war against terrorism is a new kind of war,” 
Gonzales wrote. “In my judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations 
on questioning of enemy prisoners.”208 Gonzales advised Bush to declare al Qaeda and the 
Taliban outside the protection of the Geneva Conventions in order to prevent American officials 
from being exposed to the 1996 War Crimes Act.  
 This proposal to break from the tradition of respecting and supporting the Geneva 
Conventions was met with significant criticism from elsewhere in the administration. Secretary 
of State Colin Powell and State Department Legal Advisor William Taft IV—great-grandson of 
the former president who had promoted the theory of a constrained executive—argued strongly 
against selectively suspending the Conventions. On January 11, Taft drafted a response to Yoo 
and Delahunty’s January 9 memo calling the legal reasoning “seriously flawed” and 
“fundamentally inaccurate.”209 Neither Powell nor Taft specifically disputed that the president 
had the executive authority to make such a decision, but they worried that suspending the 
Geneva Conventions would harm the U.S.’s international credibility, jeopardize support from 
critical U.S. allies, and undermine the protection of the laws of war for American troops.210 
 The back-and-forth between the Powell-Taft side and the Cheney-Yoo side continued, 
but Bush ultimately sided against his Secretary of State. On February 7, he signed a memo that 
declared, “Pursuant to my authority as Commander in Chief…[I] determine that none of the 
provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout 
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the world.”211 Enemy combatants would be treated, as Donald Rumsfeld put it, in a manner 
“reasonably consistent” with the Conventions “for the most part.”212 The administration 
defended its suspension of the Geneva Conventions, calling the detainees “the worst of the 
worst,” according to Cheney, and “among the most dangerous, best-trained, vicious killers on the 
face of the planet,” according to Rumsfeld.213 But it would later be clear that besides a relatively 
small population of known terrorists, many of the detainees sent to Guantánamo were not 
hardened terrorists but rather individuals forcibly conscripted to join the Taliban and handed 




In December 2002, The Washington Post reported “stress and duress” tactics—such as 
being held in painful positions and being deprived of sleep—being used by CIA interrogators 
against enemy combatants. In response to the report and the subsequent outrage over these 
methods, Department of Defense General Counsel William J. Haynes II stated that “United 
States policy condemns torture.”215 In April 2004, disturbing pictures from the Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq were released, revealing the torture of prisoners captured in the Iraq war, who were 
being held as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. One picture showed a hooded man 
standing on a box with electrical wires attached to his body, another showed dogs lunging at 
prisoners. Further investigation revealed the violent, humiliating, and degrading treatment 
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prisoners endured.216 The Bush administration was quick to condemn the abuse in Abu Ghraib as 
the acts of rogue agents and not part of U.S. policy.217 But memos leaked a few months later 
showed that the administration had been laying the legal groundwork to allow for brutal 
interrogation techniques years earlier. 
On March 13, 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel sent a secret memo to Defense 
Department General Counsel William Haynes. The memo, signed by Assistant Attorney General 
Jay Bybee but written largely by John Yoo, argued that the president had unfettered authority to 
transfer U.S. detainees to foreign governments whose interrogators used torture, a process called 
“extraordinary rendition,” despite a treaty that forbade the practice.218 The OLC employed the 
same logic as it had in many earlier memos, contending that the president’s commander in chief 
powers allowed him to disregard treaties and statutes to effectively do anything with wartime 
prisoners.  
The argument that the president’s commander in chief powers gave him the constitutional 
authority to interrogate enemy combatants for intelligence, and the clever construction of torture 
by the administration, was employed through a series of secret OLC and CIA memos, later 
dubbed by critics as the “torture memos,” to create a complex and brutal interrogation program. 
In the memos, the administration developed a narrow definition of torture to permit a broad 
range of interrogation methods they deemed to legally not be torture—so-called “enhanced 
interrogation” such as waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and cramped confinement—as well as 
the dismissal of federal laws, treaties, and international laws against torture.219 These techniques 
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were used in U.S. prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan, at CIA black sites, and at Guantánamo.220 In 
an infamous August 2002 OLC memo to Alberto Gonzales, Bybee (though the memo was 
reportedly drafted by Yoo) asserted that for an act to constitute torture, it would have to inflict 
extreme pain or suffering resulting in, for example, “such as organ failure, impairment of bodily 
function, or even death” and even then only if pain was the “precise objective.”221 Anything 
short of that was not torture. Even with this narrow definition of torture, Yoo argued that 
Congressional efforts to regulate interrogation would “violate the Constitution’s sole vesting of 
the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President” because “Congress can no more interfere 
with the President’s conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate 
strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield.”222 National security advisor to President George 
H.W. Bush Donald Gregg wrote in The New York Times that the legal memos on the treatment of 
prisoners “cleared the way for the horrors that have been revealed in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Guantánamo and make a mockery of administration assertions that a few misguided enlisted 
personnel perpetrated the vile abuse of prisoners.”223  
 
Trials and Tribunals 
 
Bush’s November 13, 2001, military order established that if enemy combatants were to 
be tried, they would be brought before a military tribunal system. The system initially applied 
only to noncitizens who the president determined to be current or former members of al Qaeda, 
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“engaged in, aided and abetted, or conspired to commit acts of international terrorism or acts in 
preparation thereof” against “the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or 
economy” or had knowingly harbored someone who had.224 The Order authorized the tribunals 
to operate in secret and allowed them to impose the death penalty without unanimity. It also 
allowed Bush to overturn the original verdict of the tribunals.225 The military commission system 
Bush laid out in his order was met with immediate criticism for allowing for wide-scale civil 
rights violations. In an op-ed in The New York Times, Gonzales defended Bush against these 
criticisms, saying “Military commissions do not undermine the constitutional values of civil 
liberties or separation of powers; they protect them by ensuring that the United States may wage 
war against external enemies and defeat them.”226 Less than two months after the Order was 
issued, the administration changed its policies to require a unanimous verdict to impose a death 
penalty and established that the proof of guilt had to be beyond reasonable doubt.227  
The military commissions system was also controversial for concentrating power in the 
hands of the executive. Unlike normal trials where the legislative branch defines the crime and 
sets the penalty, the executive branch investigates the crime and prosecutes the accused, and the 
judicial branch tries the accused and determines guilt, in the military commissions system all of 
those powers were granted to the military, led by its commander in chief—the president.228 The 
president’s unilateral decision to create the system on his own authority, without Congressional 
authorization, was met with criticism. In an essay in the Yale Law Journal, legal scholars Neal 
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Katyal and Laurence Tribe argued that Bush’s Order was unconstitutional and called for an 
authorization of Congress to establish and legitimize the military tribunals. “Throughout its 
history, there have been times when our nation has proceeded on the premise that civil trials and 
various other protections ordinarily entailed by due process need not, and in all fairness should 
not, be demanded. Yet those circumstances have been rare, carefully circumscribed, and virtually 
never defined by a single person. Unacceptable danger lurks if power to define such 
extraordinary circumstances is left in the hands of any one individual, however earnestly he may 
believe the nation is in grave peril. The need for congressional authorization, while always 
important, is never more so than when the judiciary cannot be relied upon to enforce the 
Constitution with all due vigor,” they wrote.229  
 
Casting Aside Checks  
 
The creation and development of the enemy combatant policy by the Bush administration 
shows a gradual expansion of power based on a theory of inherent executive authority in a time 
of war. Over and over again, the administration’s lawyers justified their national security policy 
by appealing to the president’s power as commander in chief. With this reliance on executive 
authority came a sidelining of other branches of government and more traditional sources of 
presidential power. The administration asserted the sole power to designate enemy combatants, 
argued that no court could question their detention, and that neither international law or Congress 
could regulate interrogations. This represented a seizing of powers for the president by casting 
aside restraining forces and the system of checks and balances. 
The development of these enemy combatant policies was followed closely by their 
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challenges, both in the courts and in Congress. Just as the designation expanded piece by piece, 
the policies were dismantled in a similar way. The court cases and congressional measures that 
followed challenged the Bush administration’s broad interpretation of executive authority and 
led to the fall of some of the policies covered in this chapter, indicating a reining in of 
presidential power.  
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Chapter 4: Challenges to Enemy Combatant Policy 
 
By early 2003, the steady expansion of presidential power based on a theory of inherent 
executive authority began to face setbacks. Over the course of just a few months, several key 
lawyers who helped craft the legal framework for the administration’s enemy combatant 
policies—allies of Vice President Cheney who championed his expansive view of presidential 
power—left the executive branch. Their replacements turned out to be more moderate on 
executive authority than the White House had intended and were less eager to undercut legal 
limits to presidential power. This threatened the expansive structure of executive power that was 
constructed in response to the September 11 attacks and prompted internal conflict within the 
executive branch. To make matters worse for the administration, its enemy combatant policies 
were soon challenged before the Supreme Court, which would rebuke its most extreme claims of 
executive authority. And Congress, which had largely been deferential to the president and 
supported his national security initiatives, began to cast a more critical eye on the White House. 
The dismantling of some of the enemy combatant policies, and the administration’s claims to 
power more broadly, signaled a reintroduction of traditional checks on executive authority and a 
rejection of some of the administration’s most bold theories of presidential power.  
 
Changes Within the Administration 
 
A wave of departures within the administration began in December 2002 when Deputy 
White House Legal Counsel Timothy Flanigan, who worked closely with Cheney’s legal counsel 
David Addington, left the White House for the private sector.230 Just a few months later, Jay 
Bybee left his position as head of the OLC, where he had signed off on several of John Yoo’s 
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secret memos, including the so-called torture memos, to be a judge for the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit.231 With Bybee’s position now open, Addington and White House Counsel 
Alberto Gonzales wanted Yoo to take his place; he was a trusted ally who had worked closely 
with them to expand the president’s power since September 11.232 But Attorney General John 
Ashcroft resented Yoo for going over his head to create a private channel between the OLC and 
White House and blocked his promotion. With no chance of ascending beyond the number two 
spot, Yoo resigned from the OLC in the summer of 2003 and returned to teaching law at 
Berkeley.233  
 At Yoo’s suggestion, the administration chose Jack Goldsmith to be the new head of the 
OLC. Goldsmith had been a law professor at the University of Chicago School of Law, but since 
2002 he had worked as a legal advisor to the Pentagon’s general counsel, where he advised the 
Defense Department on detainee treatment at Guantánamo and military commissions.234 On 
paper, Goldsmith looked like an apt replacement for Yoo. The two were friends and academics 
in conservative legal circles and they had co-written articles advocating for presidential power.235 
Goldsmith had been an early advocate for the president’s authority to detain enemy combatants 
and to try them by a military commissions system, and he supported the administration’s 
decision to deny Taliban and al Qaeda fighters prisoner-of-war status.236  
 Almost immediately after Goldsmith was confirmed as Assistant Attorney General for 
the OLC by the Senate in October 2003, he proved to be different from Yoo. Soon after he 
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started at the OLC, a dispute among lawyers within the executive branch over whether detained 
Iraqi insurgents were protected by the Geneva Conventions created two factions within the legal 
team.237 On one side, Addington and others argued that like the insurgents in Afghanistan, those 
in Iraq were not protected by the Conventions, while on the other side, a group led by OLC 
deputy Patrick Philbin disagreed. In a bold move, Goldsmith sided against Addington and argued 
that the Geneva Conventions did apply to captured insurgents in Iraq and the president could not 
work around that protection.238 
 Goldsmith’s biggest challenge to the president’s national security strategy and claim to 
executive power came through rescinding critical OLC memos regarding interrogation. When he 
assumed his position in the OLC, Goldsmith did not know that the office had created a legal 
framework for torture and that his friend John Yoo was its lead architect. A few weeks into the 
job, Goldsmith was alerted by Philbin about a worrying OLC opinion. He considered Philbin’s 
concern as serious and credible because, according to Goldsmith, Philbin “was not squeamish 
about pushing the President’s power to its limits.”239 Goldsmith proceeded to read several OLC 
memos concerning interrogation, including the infamous “torture memo.” As he investigated the 
interrogation memos and other OLC opinions that backed some of the government’s most 
sensitive counterterrorism opinions, Goldsmith concluded that “some were deeply flawed: 
sloppily reasoned, overbroad, and inaccurate in asserting extraordinary constitutional authorities 
on behalf of the President.”240 He was particularly concerned about the OLC’s “unusual lack of 
care and sobriety” regarding the president’s commander-in-chief powers in the interrogation 
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opinions.241 He wrote in his memoir, “When one concludes that Congress is disabled from 
controlling the President, and especially when one concludes this in secret, respect for separation 
of powers demands a full consideration of competing congressional and judicial prerogatives, 
which was lacking in the interrogation opinions.”242  
Goldsmith did not know about the government’s torture program and feared that the 
memos could be used to greenlight harsh interrogations. He believed withdrawing the 
interrogation memos would be the best course of action.243 He started with the most recent 
interrogation memo: Yoo’s March 13 memo which gave the Pentagon sweeping authority—
similar to that authorized by the 2002 “torture memo” to the CIA—to interrogate enemy 
combatants held at Guantánamo Bay.244 The CIA interrogation memos posed a bigger challenge, 
and Goldsmith was not willing to withdraw them before creating a replacement opinion, and he 
turned his attention to other pressing legal matters.  
In April 2004, before Goldsmith returned to the question of interrogation, the Abu Ghraib 
scandal broke, revealing the CIA’s mistreatment and humiliation of prisoners in Iraqi prisons, 
and that June, the existence of the interrogation opinions leaked to the press. As public outcry 
mounted, Goldsmith withdrew the interrogation opinions on June 14, an extraordinary step of 
publically rejecting the government’s own legal analysis.245 Two days later, Goldsmith handed 
Ashcroft his letter of resignation.246 Withdrawing the OLC’s interrogation memos was 
Goldsmith’s last move in an effort to reinstate a balance of powers. 
Yet, even after Goldsmith officially withdrew the interrogation memos, the 
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administration did not retreat on its claims that presidential power allowed for harsh 
interrogation techniques. In his confirmation hearings for his appointment to Attorney General 
later in 2004, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales argued that while claims to presidential 
power over torture were unnecessary because the president had no intention of authorizing 
torture, they were not flat out wrong. Gonzales also claimed that the CIA was not bound by the 
same rules of humane treatment as were military personnel.247 
 
Challenges in the Courts: The Enemy Combatant Cases 
 
The U.S. government’s initial position on enemy combatants held at Guantánamo Bay 
was that they were subject to military detention, but were not given combatant immunity or 
protected as prisoners-of-war under the Geneva Conventions. This created what many critics 
called a “legal black hole” at Guantánamo where detainees were held under conditions 
determined by the U.S. government without the protection of international law. In practice. this 
meant that the president could detain citizens and noncitizens he deemed as enemy combatant 
indefinitely without charge or trial. In the years after the first prisoners were brought to 
Guantánamo, human rights groups challenged the government’s policies and pushed for the 
habeas corpus rights of enemy combatants by filing lawsuits on their behalf. Starting in 2004, a 
series of enemy combatant cases reached the Supreme Court to define the role of the branches of 
government in the war on terror and judge the administration’s claim of unfettered presidential 
authority. The cases reveal the logic of the administration’s defense of its post-September 11 
policies; the claims made by the administration were based on the premise that Article II of the 
Constitution gives the president inherent authority to act impervious to congressional oversight 
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and judicial review. The decisions in these Supreme Court cases created a body of law that 
altered enemy combatant policy to give detainees more rights and scaled back some of the 
administration’s boldest claims of executive authority.  
 
Rasul v. Bush 
 
Rasul v. Bush, the first Supreme Court case that considered whether enemy combatants 
should have access to the legal system, laid the foundation for enemy combatant litigation. The 
case involved 14 foreign national petitioners who had been captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
in the U.S. campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban and were being held at Guantánamo. The 
detainees’ families filed a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detentions and 
accused the government of violating their due process rights by denying the men access to 
attorneys and detaining them indefinitely. The government argued that the courts had no 
jurisdiction to hear the case because the detainees were not U.S. citizens and were being held in a 
territory (Guantánamo Bay, Cuba) outside of the sovereignty of the United States (the United 
States had leased its naval base at Guantánamo Bay from Cuba since 1903, but Cuba holds 
“ultimate sovereignty”). The detainees’ lawyer refuted that the prison was under Cuban control. 
He pointed out that the Cuban iguana was protected under the U.S. Endangered Species Act; 
iguanas thus had greater legal protection than humans at Guantánamo.248  The government 
argued that the questions raised by the petitioners about the conduct of the war on terror were 
ones “the Constitution leaves to the President as Commander in Chief,” and thus the courts had 
no jurisdiction to “evaluate or second-guess the conduct of the President and the military.”249 
Both the district court and Court of Appeals sided with the government.  
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 In its Supreme Court brief, the administration cited Johnson v. Eisentrager, a 1950 
Supreme Court case that ruled that U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over German unlawful enemy 
combatants held in U.S.-controlled prisons in Germany. The government claimed that like the 
detainees in Eisentrager, enemy combatants held at Guantánamo could not file habeas petitions 
in U.S. courts because they too were being held by the military outside the sovereign territory of 
the United States.250 The government argued that if the Court were to break from this precedent, 
it would “raise grave constitutional concerns” by infringing on the president’s power. It stated in 
the brief: 
 
The Constitution commits to the political branches and, in particular, the President, the 
responsibility for conducting the Nation's foreign affairs and military operations. 
Exercising jurisdiction over claims filed on behalf of aliens held at Guantanamo would 
place the federal courts in the unprecedented position of micro-managing the Executive's 
handling of captured enemy combatants from a distant combat zone where American 
troops are still fighting; require U.S. soldiers to divert their attention from the combat 
operations overseas; and strike a serious blow to the military's intelligence-gathering 
operations at Guantanamo.251  
 
This line of reasoning that warned the courts from overstepping their role and asserted the 
president’s inherent right in times of war would become common in the enemy combatant cases 
to support the administration’s claim of unilateral power in the arena of national security.  
On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Rasul v. Bush—its first 
evaluation of the legal rights of enemy combatants captured in the war on terror. In a six to three 
decision written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court ruled that federal courts had jurisdiction 
to consider habeas petitions of foreign nationals held at Guantánamo. Although Cuba retained 
“ultimate sovereignty” over Guantánamo, the Court found, the United States exercised “plenary 
                                                




and exclusive jurisdiction” over the base, making Cuba’s sovereignty irrelevant to the matter.252 
The Court used this to distinguish Guantánamo from the military base in Germany used in the 
Eisentrager case, in addition to the fact that none of the detainees were nationals of a country at 
war with the United States, unlike in Eisentrager. Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus 
was not dependent on citizenship and so the enemy combatants held at Guantánamo were 
“entitled to invoke the federal courts.”253 
 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
 
On the same day that the Court ruled in the Rasul case, it also handed down its ruling in a 
similar case on the rights of enemy combatants but this time involving a U.S. citizen. As 
mentioned in Chapter Three, in the fall of 2001, the U.S. military detained 21-year-old American 
citizen Yaser Hamdi in Afghanistan. Hamdi was accused of fighting for the Taliban and was 
labeled an enemy combatant and held at Guantánamo Bay. When interrogators realized that 
Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, he was transferred to naval brigs in Virginia and South Carolina, 
where he continued to be held incommunicado as an enemy combatant without being charged 
with a crime or given an opportunity to contest his enemy combatant status. In June 2002, 
Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on his son’s behalf to challenge the 
legality of his detention.  
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the government’s argument that the 
power to detain those captured in armed struggle rests with the president and that efforts by the 
judicial branch to intervene violated the separation of powers.254 It therefore deferred to the 
executive’s determination of enemy combatant status in the case. This decision was appealed to 
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the Supreme Court. In their Supreme Court brief, the petitioners argued that the government 
violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to due process by holding him indefinitely based on his 
enemy combatant designation. Further, they asserted, “Judicial review of executive decision is 
demanded by, not contrary to, the separation of powers” and once a citizen is removed from an 
area of fighting, the executive does not have the authority to detain the citizen indefinitely 
without authorization by Congress.255  
The government, meanwhile, argued in its Supreme Court brief that by labeling Hamdi as 
an enemy combatant, he could be held and was not entitled to meet with counsel or challenge his 
detention. They claimed that as commander in chief, the president has the authority to detain 
enemy combatants in wartime, including U.S. citizens, and that the president’s authority to do so 
was supported by (but not reliant on) Congress’s 2001 AUMF. Throughout its brief, the 
government focused on the idea of inherent presidential authority to detain Hamdi, whom they 
classified as an “archetypal battlefield combatant.”256 “A commander’s wartime determination 
that an individual is an enemy combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, representing a 
core exercise of the Commander-in-Chief authority,” the government asserted in its brief.257  
In an opinion backed by a plurality of the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote that 
American citizens held in the United States as enemy combatants must be given due process 
rights and have the ability to contest their enemy combatant status.258 The Court ruled that absent 
a Congressional suspension of habeas corpus, citizens detained as enemy combatants are entitled 
to some form of due process. In O’Connor’s opinion, she recognized that Congress had 
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authorized the detention of enemy combatants in the 2001 AUMF, and because of this, the ruling 
did not address the question of whether Article II of the Constitution gives the president the 
authority to detain citizens as enemy combatants.259 But the Court did contest the 
administration’s claim that the separation of powers required the court to defer to the Executive 
branch’s enemy combatant determinations. The plurality rejected the administration’s “highly 
circumscribed role” for the courts and famously stated that “a state of war is not a blank check 
for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”260 “Whatever power the 
United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with 
enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches 
when individual liberties are at stake,” O’Connor wrote in the opinion.261 In October 2004, 
Hamdi was deported to Saudi Arabia instead of being given the hearing the Supreme Court ruled 
he was entitled to receive.262 
 In response to the rulings in Rasul and Hamdi that allowed for due process challenges 
from enemy combatants, the Defense Department created two new systems to determine the 
status of enemy combatants. The first were Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), 
created by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz nine days after the Court issued its 
rulings, which were one-time proceedings to determine if detainees held at Guantánamo Bay had 
been correctly classified as enemy combatants.263 If the CSRTs found that a detainee had not 
been correctly classified, they could recommend release or repatriation. When the hearings began 
in July 2004, over 580 detainees were being held as enemy combatants at Guantánamo. The 
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hearings were held privately, with redacted transcripts for hearings of high-value detainees 
released to the public. The legitimacy of this process would come into question in Boumediene v. 
Bush four years later. The second system created by the Defense Department was the 
Administrative Review Boards (ARBs), which were created to follow up on CSRT hearings 
annually to determine if an enemy combatant continued to pose a threat to the United States. 
Both CSRTs and ARBs were overseen by the new Office for the Administrative Review of the 
Detention of Enemy Combatants within the Defense Department. 
 Congress also responded to the rulings in Rasul and Hamdi by passing the Detainee 
Treatment Act (DTA) in 2005. Among other measures, the DTA sought to strip all U.S. courts of 
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by enemy combatants, as established by Rasul, and instead 
funneled a more limited judicial review of CSRT decisions exclusively to D.C. Court of 
Appeals.264 The law did not make clear whether this restriction on habeas petitions would 
include those already pending in the judicial system—an issue that would be taken up by the 
Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.  
 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla and Padilla v. Hanft 
 
As detailed in Chapter Three, José Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was arrested at O’Hare Airport 
for being a “material witness” to a terrorism investigation. Two days before his scheduled 
hearing in a civilian court, Bush signed an order that designated him an enemy combatant and 
transferred him from civilian custody to a military brig in South Carolina where he was held 
incommunicado.265 Attorney General John Ashcroft announced in a televised address that Padilla 
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was an “al-Qaeda operative” involved in a radiological bomb plot, a claim the administration 
would later walk back.266  
 Much like in the Hamdi case, Padilla’s lawyer filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
on behalf of Padilla to contest his detention. In December 2003, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that Padilla had to be charged with a crime or released and that the president did 
not have the power to hold Padilla without trial.267 “The President, acting alone, possesses no 
inherent constitutional authority to detain American citizens seized within the United States 
away from the zone of combat, as enemy combatants,” the court stated.268 The case was then 
brought to the Supreme Court, which did not make a decision but rather dismissed that case on a 
technicality that it was filed in the wrong district—in New York instead of South Carolina where 
Padilla was being held.269 
 After the case was refiled in South Carolina as Padilla v. Hanft, it went directly to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In September 2005, the three-judge panel ruled that 
like U.S. citizens captured on a foreign battlefield, citizens arrested in the United States could 
also be designated by the president as enemy combatants.270 Padilla’s lawyers appealed this 
ruling to the Supreme Court, but before the justices could decide to grant certiorari, the 
administration announced that Padilla would no longer be held as an enemy combatant and that 
they intended to prosecute him in a civilian court instead.271 In the criminal indictment against 
Padilla, there was no mention about the dirty bomb plot or his intent to carry out domestic 
terrorism attacks, as the administration had previously claimed to the Court of Appeals—
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allegations that the administration used to detain Padilla in military custody. Rather, the 
administration reverted to its original argument that Padilla had conspired to provide material 
support to terrorists connected to al Qaeda and the Taliban.272  
 This move was received critically by Padilla’s lawyer as well as Judge J. Michael Luttig, 
who had written the ruling for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In a bold December 2005 
opinion, Luttig—one of the most conservative judges in the federal judiciary who favored broad 
executive power—accused the administration of manipulating the judicial system to avoid giving 
the Supreme Court the opportunity to review his own opinion, one that had been made based on 
an earlier set of facts about Padilla’s attempt to plot an attack on U.S. soil.273  In an attempt to get 
the case to the Supreme Court for it to review the faulty precedent it had unknowingly set, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to authorize Padilla’s transfer from the military brig to 
civilian custody, despite the fact that this transfer was supported by Padilla’s lawyer as well as 
the government. This measure was overruled by the Supreme Court. In April 2006, the Supreme 
Court declined to hear Padilla’s case contesting his enemy combatant designation, considering it 
moot since he was no longer being held as an enemy combatant. This left the Fourth Circuit 
Court’s ruling that the president had the authority to designate as enemy combatants American 
citizens captured in the U.S. as precedent, just as Luttig had feared.274 
 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld  
 
The 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case concerned the administration’s use of military 
commissions to try terrorist suspects. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who had been Osama bin Laden’s 
driver, was captured by Afghan forces in November 2001 and eventually detained at 
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Guantánamo Bay. Though Hamdan maintained he had only worked for bin Laden and was not a 
terrorist, the administration accused him of being a member of al Qaeda and decided he would be 
one of the first prisoners to be tried by the new military commission system for conspiring to 
commit terrorist acts.275 Before the commission could begin, Hamdan’s lawyers filed a lawsuit 
against the government claiming that Bush did not have the power to establish a military 
commission system without Congressional approval nor did he have the power to disregard the 
Geneva Conventions in the conflict in Afghanistan.276 
 In its Supreme Court brief, the government argued that Congress authorized the use of 
military commissions in the conflict with al Qaeda in both the Detainee Treatment Act as well as 
the AUMF.277 Even if Congress had not made these authorizations, the government argued, the 
president still held the inherent authority to establish military commissions. “When the 
Constitution was written and ratified, it was well recognized that one of the powers inherent in 
military command was the authority to institute tribunals for punishing enemy violations of the 
law of war,” the government claimed.278 
 In June 2006, the Court ruled that Bush had neither the constitutional authority nor the 
authorization by Congress to establish the military commissions to try cases in the war on terror, 
and therefore the military commission system could not be used to try detainees.279 The Court 
settled the question of jurisdiction by establishing that the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, which 
stripped federal courts of habeas jurisdiction over cases filed by Guantánamo detainees, did not 
apply to pending cases including the Hamdan case. In a five-three decision (newly-appointed 
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Chief Justice John Roberts abstained because he had heard the case when he was on the appellate 
bench) written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that because the commissions were 
not authorized by Congress, they had to comply with U.S. law and the laws of war. Therefore, 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions (both of which the Court said 
were violated by the administration’s commissions) were to be enforced. The court thus rejected 
the claims made by the administration’s legal team that the Constitution gave the president some 
inherent power that allowed him to create the military commission. It also rejected the argument 
that the president is not bound by laws or international treaties in the fight against terrorism, and 
it established that the United States continued to be bound by Article Three of the Geneva 
Convention which guarantees fair trials to those captured in armed conflict and outlaws cruel 
treatment and torture of detainees. 
Though the Court’s ruling shut down the military commission trials, the justices made 
clear that they were not categorically illegal but rather that Bush did not have the authority to 
establish them. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer explained that the commissions 
were not prohibited if authorized by Congress. He wrote, “Congress has denied the President the 
legislative authority to create military commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents 
the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”280 
After the decision was handed down, Bush did just that. What resulted was the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), which authorized the trial of enemy combatants by military 
commission and stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
(including pending cases) from noncitizen enemy combatant detainees.281 In eliminating habeas 
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corpus rights of enemy combatants, the law virtually reversed the court’s ruling in Rasul and 
meant that hundreds of prisoners at Guantánamo would not be able to petition their detention. 
The MCA also identified enemy combatants as anyone who “engaged in hostilities or who has 
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States.”282 With this 
definition, Congress gave the president the broad power to designate citizens as enemy 
combatants, even if they had no connection to al Qaeda or the Taliban. The MCA radically pared 
the power of the judiciary to check the president and embedded broad executive powers in 
statute. But just two years later, the constitutionality of this law would be challenged in 
Boumediene v. Bush.  
 
Boumediene v. Bush 
 
The Supreme Court’s last Guantánamo case concerned habeas corpus rights of detainees 
and the legality of the Military Commissions Act. The Boumediene case consolidated the cases 
of six Algerian detainees who were legal residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina and captured by 
Bosnian police in October 2001 for suspicion of plotting to attack the U.S. embassy in 
Sarajevo.283 The men were designated enemy combatants by the United States and held at 
Guantánamo. Lakhdar Boumediene, one of the detainees, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus 
in 2004, which the district court denied on the basis that the detention facility was outside U.S. 
territory and not in the court’s jurisdiction. However, after the Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. 
Bush that habeas rights extend to detainees at Guantánamo, the petitioners gained new grounds. 
But in 2006, the Military Commissions Act passed by Congress barred federal courts from 
hearing habeas petitions from enemy combatants. In their second appeal, lawyers for the 
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detainees argued that the MCA did not pertain to their petitions, and in the case that it did, it 
violated the Suspension Clause of the Constitution. The Suspension Clause states: “The Privilege 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”284 
In a five-four decision handed down in June 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that enemy 
combatants held at Guantánamo, both citizens and noncitizens, held the right to pursue habeas 
challenges to their detention. The decision states that the MCA violated the Suspension Clause 
and therefore unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus for enemy combatants. The 
Court also found that the limited system of judicial review under the Detainee Treatment Act of 
2005 was not an adequate substitute for a writ of habeas corpus.285 In the majority opinion, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy warned that if the executive and legislative branches “have the power 
to switch the Constitution on or off at will” it would lead to a “regime in which Congress and the 
President, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”286  
The Court’s decision in Boumediene confirmed combatants’ right to challenge their 
detention in the courts and led to dozens of habeas corpus petitions. While the D.C. district court 
judges ruled in favor of many detainees, the rulings were overturned by conservative appeals 
court judges. These measures were described by New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse as, 
“what at least from the outside looked like a systematic effort to ‘clean up the mess’ by rendering 
a potentially powerful rights-protecting decision toothless.”287 Though the Court in Boumediene 
claimed the right to review cases in theory, in practice lower courts ultimately rejected many 
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detainee cases.  
The series of Guantánamo cases established a new body of law governing military 
detention in the war on terror and clarified the rights of enemy combatants detained in the 
conflict. The aforementioned cases represent the small number of habeas cases that reached the 
Supreme Court; many more went no further than circuit courts, meaning much of the law 
regarding detention came from lower courts.288 Taken together, the cases highlight common 
arguments made by the government: that as commander in chief the president has vast inherent 
powers that cannot be hindered by the other branches, that Congress had authorized the 
president’s actions but that he was not dependent on this authorization, and that the Court was 
overstepping its role by adjudicating these cases. Case after case, the justices pushed back 
against the administration’s claims of exclusive control over enemy combatants and asserted the 
role of the judiciary in settling issues regarding detainees and maintaining the balance of power. 
While many of the cases represented only modest setbacks for the administration’s policies—
after all, in Hamdi the government retained the right to detain enemy combatants and in Padilla 
the administration won outright—the rulings signified a rebuke of the administration’s claims of 
exclusive power over the matter. The Court asserted judicial power, establishing that issues 
surrounding enemy combatants were to be decided by the court and readjusting the balance of 
power, and in doing so affected the policies themselves.  
 
 
The Role of Congress 
 
In a concurring opinion in the 1952 Youngstown Steel case that contested the president’s 
conduct during the Korean War, which Congress had not authorized, Justice Robert Jackson 
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recognized presidential power not to be static, but rather changing in accordance with the other 
branches of government, and particularly in its relationship with Congress. “While the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will 
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches 
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed 
but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress,” he 
wrote.289 Jackson’s message received renewed attention during the Bush era as it offered a 
framework to understand the relationship between Bush and Congress during the war on terror. 
In his concurring opinion, Jackson developed a taxonomy for evaluating the constitutionality of a 
president’s actions, which were dependent on congressional support. He wrote that presidents 
should seek congressional approval whenever possible to keep government under the law and 
that a president’s authority was at the maximum when he or she acts “pursuant to an express of 
implied authorization of Congress.”290 The second category is “a zone of twilight” where 
Congress neither grants nor denies authority to an action taken by the president. In this zone of 
twilight, the president can only rely upon his or her own powers. The third category is where the 
president’s actions are at odds with the will of Congress. In this area, the president’s power is “at 
its lowest ebb,” Jackson said, and claims of executive authority “must be scrutinized with 
caution.”291 In several notable occasions, Bush worked in the second and third categories that 
Jackson laid out, working without Congressional approval or, later in his administration, working 
against the will of Congress to advance his enemy combatant policies. Observers at the time 
were struck by the unyielding powers the administration claimed. In 2006 the New York Times 
                                                




editorial board wrote, “the system of checks and balances is a safety net that doesn't feel 
particularly sturdy at present. The administration seems determined to cut off legitimate court 
scrutiny, and the Republicans who dominate the House and Senate generally intervene only to 
change the rules so Mr. Bush can do whatever he wants.”292 
The response to the September 11 attacks and the fear and uncertainty it produced 
allowed for a strong executive and for legislators to grant the executive additional powers to 
protect the country. After all, in times of crisis, both lawmakers and the general public 
historically have looked, as they did in 2001, to a strong, central leader.293 While the crisis that 
unfolded on September 11 made it evident that a strong president was important, it also made 
apparent that Congress continued to have a role to play.  
The development and implementation of enemy combatant policy, like much of the 
government’s action in the war on terror, was led by the executive branch, which often bypassed 
Congress to pursue its agenda. Through executive orders and national security directives, Bush 
unilaterally created agencies like the Office of Homeland Security, froze assets of U.S. banks 
with possible links to al Qaeda, developed the infrastructure to detain and interrogate 
combatants, and established military tribunals to try suspected terrorists.294 The Bush 
administration not only made sweeping claims of its constitutional powers, but it also claimed 
that Congress did not have the power to limit the president in matters related to war. In a secret 
opinion referenced in Chapter Two written weeks after the September 11 attacks that was not 
made public until years later, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the OLC John Yoo wrote 
                                                
292 “A Stumble a Day ...,” The New York Times, March 15, 2006, sec. Editorial, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/15/opinion/a-stumble-a-day.html. 
293 Savage, Takeover, 311. 
294 William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War 
Powers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 228. 
	91 
that though Congress had recognized (with the AUMF) that the president could take action 
against the terrorist threat, it could not “place any limits on the President's determinations as to 
any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, 
and nature of the response. These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President alone to 
make.”295 In other words, the president did not really need Congressional approval for its war 
efforts. In a March 2002 memo, Yoo re-emphasized this point, linking the president’s inherent 
authority to its enemy combatant policy: “As the President possess the Commander-in-Chief and 
Executive powers alone, Congress cannot constitutionally restrict or regulate the President's 
decision to commence hostilities or to direct the military, once engaged. This would include not 
just battlefield tactics, but also the disposition of captured enemy combatants.”296 According to 
Yoo, Congress could not challenge the president’s conduct of war or decisions regarding 
detained enemy combatants.  
Observers of the administration, like Benjamin Wittes, found that it considered going to 
Congress as “implicit acknowledgment that it lacked the inherent power to do what it needed, as 
an acknowledgment that it had to ask for permission.”297 Much like the argument Truman made 
in the 1950s to avoid asking Congress for approval to enter into war in Korea, Bush and his legal 
circle believed that asking Congress for approval for wartime actions was an admission that the 
president needed Congressional authority in the zone of warfare. In my interview with Wittes, he 
explained that this was his biggest criticism of the administration. “They confused doing it with 
doing it on their own. You know, it was not enough for them to have a robust interrogation 
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capacity, robust intelligence capacity, robust detention capacity, a new trial regime. They had to 
do all this. It wasn't a win unless they did it without Congress. And that was very foolish,” he 
said.298 Further, the administration claimed that it could disregard statute, like the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, and treaties, like the Geneva Conventions.299 In their landmark Harvard Law 
Review article, David Barron and Martin Lederman find that these claims are part of a historical 
trend in the relationship between Congress and presidents during war. They argue that like other 
presidents since World War I, Bush “extended his assertion of preclusive powers beyond 
contexts involving the actual conduct of hostilities to others relating to the organization and use 
of the armed forces and intelligence agencies.”300 The previously mentioned March 2002 OLC 
memo exemplifies this claim of preclusive powers extending beyond the conduct of war.  
Conversely, Congress did little to monitor and oversee the actions of the Bush 
administration. Journalist Susan Milligan found that during the 108th Congress, in 2003 to 2004, 
there were 37 hearings described as “oversight” compared to 135 hearings between 1993 and 
1994, the last year of the Clinton administration when the party in both chambers of Congress 
was the same as the one in the White House.301 And whereas in the mid-1990s, Congress took 
140 hours of sworn testimony on whether Clinton used the White House Christmas card list to 
find potential donors, between 2004 and 2005 House Republicans took 12 hours of testimony on 
the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal.302  
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 When the president did consult Congress, Congress showed deference to the 
administration. This was in part because of the partisan composition of Congress.303 From 2001 
to 2007, the president and both chambers of Congress were controlled by the Republican party, 
except for a brief period when the Senate switched to Democratic control. This allowed them to 
easily have the votes to support the president’s agenda and limit oversight. But this single-party 
hold does not fully explain the deference of Congress to the presidency. After all, just a decade 
earlier when Democrats held the White House and Congress, members of Congress pushed back 
against Clinton’s major healthcare agenda.304 But after September 11, fear and war led legislators 
to cede power to the president to protect the nation, and in the following years, Congress was 
largely supportive of the administration’s agenda in the war on terror, including Bush’s detention 
and treatment of enemy combatants, and it willingly yielded vast authority to the White House. 
Its Authorization for the Use of Military Force, passed by every member of Congress but one, 
gave the president the broad authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against those 
responsible for the September 11 attacks and the Patriot Act, which passed with an 
overwhelmingly bipartisan vote, significantly enhanced law enforcement and intelligence 
capabilities. In 2006, at the administration’s request, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment 
Act to effectively reverse the Supreme Court’s Rasul decision and took a similar measure again 
the following year when it passed the Military Commissions Act, which essentially eliminated 
the Supreme Court’s ability to check the president’s power in its treatment of enemy combatants. 
Congress was thus largely supportive of the president’s agenda when it was asked to get 
involved. Republican members were both politically and ideologically inclined to support the 
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administration and Democratic members were fearful of being viewed as soft on terror.305  
 One area where Congress challenged the president was on the topic of torture. In July 
2005, Senator John McCain introduced an amendment to the annual defense appropriations bill 
that established that military interrogators could not go beyond the limits of the Army Field 
Manual (created to comply with the Geneva Conventions) in their treatment and interrogation of 
detainees regardless of what their superiors tell them.306 It also banned the use of "cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment" by anyone, including CIA agents, on anyone in U.S. 
government custody anywhere in the world.307 The measure shocked the White House and 
Cheney personally went to Congress to lobby against the legislation. In October, the White 
House threatened that Bush would use his first veto against the bill, warning that it would 
interfere with the president's ability to carry out the war on terror.308 But in an unusual bipartisan 
rebuke to the administration, the Senate voted 90 to 9 to approve the amendment. After a 308 to 
122 vote in the House, despite persistent efforts to negotiate with McCain, the White House 
announced in December that it would accept the torture ban.309 Bush invited McCain and to the 
oval office to publically acknowledge his victory. “Senator McCain has been a leader to make 
sure that the United States of America upholds the values of America as we fight and win this 
war on terror. And we've been happy to work with him to achieve a common objective, and that 
is to make it clear to the world that this government does not torture and that we adhere to the 
international Convention of Torture, whether it be here at home or abroad,” Bush told 
reporters.310  
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 But hours after Bush signed the law to ban torture and other cruel treatment of prisoners, 
the White House quietly released a statement entered into the Federal Register. This signing 
statement—a statement issued by the president upon singing a bill to indicate his or her 
interpretation of the law—instructed military interrogators and the CIA on how to interpret the 
torture ban: “The executive branch shall construe [the ban] in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as 
Commander in Chief…which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and 
the President…of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.”311 In issuing 
this signing statement, Bush tacitly claimed that despite the law, he still had the authority to 
authorize torture when he saw fit. 
This was not the first time Bush, or any president for that matter, had used a signing 
statement to instruct the executive branch on how to interpret or carry out a law, but what 
distinguished Bush from his predecessors was the frequency with which he used signing 
statements. Signing statements date back to the Monroe presidency but were used infrequently 
until the mid-1980s during the Reagan administration when then-Attorney General Edwin Meese 
decided that they could be used to increase the president’s power.312 By the fifth year of his 
presidency, Bush had issued signing statements on over 750 statutes, compared to 140 issued by 
Clinton over his eight years as president and 232 issued by George H.W. Bush over his four-year 
term. While signing statements can be used to clarify a president’s intent or serve as commentary 
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on legislation, historian Louis Fisher contends that signing statements, “encourage the belief that 
the law is not what Congress places in a bill but what Presidents say about the language.”313 
Journalist Charlie Savage, who when working at The Boston Globe uncovered Bush’s use 
of signing statements, found that in the statements, “Bush has repeatedly asserted that the 
Constitution gives him the right to ignore numerous sections of the bills—sometimes including 
provisions that were the subject of negotiations with Congress in order to get lawmakers to pass 
the bill. He has appended such statements to more than one of every 10 bills he has signed.”314  
Bush had also effectively abandoned his veto power, not vetoing a single bill until the 
sixth year of his presidency and instead using signing statements to set aside statues that 
conflicted with his interpretation of the Constitution, without giving Congress the opportunity to 
override a veto. Many of the laws Bush issued signing statements for, like the torture ban, 
involved the conduct of military or intelligence agencies in the war in terror. He cited his role as 
commander in chief in statements on military matters to declare that he could ignore 
Congressional legislation and invoked the Unitary Executive Theory to assert control over the 
executive branch despite Congressional direction.315  
 The 2006 midterm elections were a turning point in the relationship between Bush and 
Congress. Democrats won control of both the House and the Senate for the first time in 12 years, 
feeding off a national dissatisfaction with Bush, primarily with the war in Iraq and the 
mishandling of Hurricane Katrina. Soon after their victory, members of the Democratic Party 
pledged that Congress would no longer serve as a rubber stamp for the president and announced 
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their intention to reestablish the legislative branch as a check on the president.316 With the new 
Congress came increased oversight of the executive branch and a flurry of bills introduced to 
regulate the president’s conduct in the war on terror, including bills to restore habeas corpus 
rights for enemy combatants and to tighten the definition of enemy combatants.317 But the bills 
had little chance of becoming law. The threat of veto and the slim Democratic majority in the 
Senate that made overriding a veto unlikely meant that many of the expansions of presidential 
power that previous Congresses had allowed would remain in statute. Yet, that Bush vetoed bills 
represented a shift in the administration’s approach to presidential power. Instead of issuing a 
signing statement to be the final word, a veto allowed Congress the possibility to override, 
working within the system of checks and balances as the Framers intended.  
 Congress posed few challenges to the administration’s enemy combatant policies. It was 
rarely part of the policy making, as the administration asserted that the president’s inherent 
powers allowed him to take action without the approval or statutory backing of Congress. And its 
lack of oversight and deference to the president’s agenda when it was consulted meant that the 
administration was able to work with and around Congress to advance its enemy combatant 
policies. Instead, challenges to the Bush administration came primarily through the courts, which 
rejected several of the administration’s policies in its detention and treatment of enemy 
combatants. The Supreme Court pushed back against the administration’s claims of exclusive 
authority over enemy combatants and affirmed the rights of enemy combatants and the role of 
the courts in carrying out judicial review.  
Soon, another election was underway—this time for the presidency. After two terms of 
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the Bush presidency, many were ready for a clearer return to checks and balances and a more 
reined in president. One person in particular was then-Senator Barack Obama. "The biggest 
problems we're facing right now have to do with George Bush trying to bring more and more 
power into the executive branch, and not go through Congress at all," Obama said in early 2008. 
"That's what I intend to reverse when I'm president of the United States of America."318 Eight 
years later, many would criticize Obama for failing to live up to this promise to reverse Bush’s 
extraordinary seizure of executive power and instead making the executive branch as strong as 
ever by continuing many of his predecessor’s national security policies. 
  
                                                




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
In its editorial on September 12, 2001, The New York Times described the tragic events of 
the previous day: “It was, in fact, one of those moments in which history splits, and we define the 
world as ‘before’ and ‘after.’ We look back at sunrise yesterday through pillars of smoke and dust, 
down streets snowed under with the atomized debris of the skyline, and we understand that 
everything has changed.”319 The September 11, 2001, attack on the United States did change 
everything. It shocked and horrified the nation, impacted countless lives, and permanently changed 
American ideas of security and safety. It also allowed for a shift in the balance of power between 
the branches of government when the Bush administration appealed to wartime powers and 
constitutional authority in its response to the crisis.  
Reporter Charlie Savage claims that there are two main strands of criticism of the Bush 
administration’s counterterrorism policies.320 The first is the civil liberties critique—that the 
policies violated civil liberties and that the government should not have the power to take certain 
actions such as detaining citizens indefinitely or torturing suspected terrorists. The second is the 
rule of law critique, which is less about the policies themselves and more the underlying legal 
framework to criticize the president for unlawfully bypassing statute and treaties to strengthen the 
executive branch. This paper dealt primarily with the latter to consider the theories of presidential 
power and legal framework that allowed for the Bush administration’s creation of enemy 
combatant policy.  
I have argued that the Bush administration’s broad understanding of executive power 
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founded in claims of inherent presidential power led to the designation of captured terrorist 
suspects as enemy combatants. It was this claim to inherent power that led the administration to 
assert that the president had the exclusive constitutional authority to detain citizens and non-
citizens indefinitely without trial, to deny these detainees the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions, and to unilaterally create a military commissions system to try the suspects. And it 
was this claim to inherent power that led the administration to argue that neither Congress nor the 
courts had authority over these policies, thereby subverting checks on presidential power. This 
served to destabilize the separation and balance of powers, and it ultimately undermined the rule 
of law. Challenges to the enemy combatant policies, primarily through the courts, invalidated some 
of the administration’s claims of inherent power and dismantled some of its policies, and 
reintroduced a role for Congress and the judiciary in national security policy.  
Members of the Bush administration likened Bush’s use of executive power to that of 
previous wartime presidents, noting that Lincoln, for example, took unilateral action to preserve 
the Union.321 But this comparison is faulty and ignores the most radical aspect of the Bush 
administration’s claims of presidential power, which this study is based on: the claims that the 
powers were inherent. After Lincoln took executive action at the start of the Civil War when 
Congress was out of session, he recognized that his actions were outside of the constitutionally 
prescribed powers of the president and asked Congress to retroactively endorse his actions.322 Bush 
and his legal advisors, meanwhile, argued that the president had inherent powers to take actions to 
protect the nation from the threat of terrorism, such as creating military commissions or 
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designating prisoners as enemy combatants, and relied on an aggressive reading of the Unitary 
Executive Theory to claim vast executive power that could not be restrained by Congress or the 
courts, thereby radically shifting the balance of power. As Louis Fisher explained, “Presidents who 
claim inherent powers move a nation from one of limited powers to boundless and ill-defined 
authority, undermining the doctrine of separated powers and the system of checks and balances.”323 
 It is worth reflecting upon the significance of how the Bush administration’s expansive 
theory of executive power yielded its enemy combatant policies and considering what alternative 
courses of action the president could, and should, have taken. A primary finding of this paper is 
that by claiming executive authority over the detention and treatment of enemy combatants, the 
Bush administration undermined the separation of powers and sidelined the other branches of 
government. A preferable and realistic alternative course of action after September 11 would be if 
Bush had received congressional support for the actions he wanted to take. As described in Chapter 
Four, Congress was very willing to support the administration, particularly in the direct aftermath 
of the attacks, and would likely have supported these very policies had Bush made an appeal to it. 
As Benjamin Wittes describes, “Had the administration gone to Congress and asked for its help in 
writing a long-term architecture for the conflict, it would surely have found a partner for the 
project.”324 Granted, the Bush administration did work with Congress to get the 2001 AUMF 
which served as the backing for much of the action taken against enemy combatants, as well as for 
the Patriot Act, the Intelligence Reform Act, and the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security. However, it initially acted unilaterally to create military commissions and develop an 
interrogation program—two essential aspects of its enemy combatant policy, as well as creating a 
warrantless surveillance apparatus. If Bush had worked with Congress to get statutory authority 
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on those issues or others in the realm of enemy combatant policy, he would have been able to place 
those policies on a more solid legal footing and perhaps face fewer challenges from the courts. In 
this scenario, it is not necessarily the policies themselves that would change (though perhaps by 
including Congress in the decision making, the policies would have taken a different shape) but 
rather the manner in which they were created and the legal backing for them.  
But that, of course, ignores the civil liberties implications of the enemy combatant policy, 
which look beyond whether Bush had the authority to unilaterally make decisions about the 
detention and treatment of enemy combatants to ask whether the policy outcomes were consistent 
with constitutional principles and individual liberty. And beyond that, whether the policies were 
moral. These questions deserve much broader consideration than can be provided here, but a 2004 
statement by Anthony Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, on 
executive power after September 11, highlights the continued importance of civil liberties in U.S. 
national security policy: 
Pursuing security at the expense of freedom is a dangerous and self-defeating proposition 
for a democracy. This is especially true in time of war when zealous government officials 
often attempt to accumulate unchecked powers under the guise of national security. The 
danger is most apparent in the expansive assertion of new executive powers at the expense 
of individual liberty. The threat is also apparent in the arbitrary, unequal and 
unconstitutional treatment of hundreds of immigrants detained after 9-11, and in the 
shameful indefinite detention of hundreds of foreigners at Guantánamo Bay. The debate 
over the proper balance between liberty and security goes to the heart of who we are as a 
nation, where we come from, and where we are headed…For the past two and a half years, 
our country has been struggling with the challenge of protecting us from a new kind of 
enemy—a loose, far-flung network of terrorist organizations whose threat will extend for 
the foreseeable future. Precisely because we expect the terrorist threat to be with us for a 
long time, we must take extra precaution to safeguard our liberties. What are we fighting 
for if not the values of freedom, liberty, equality, and tolerance?325 
 
It is also worth considering what the policies would have looked like with a different theory 
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of presidential power—how, if at all, would the counterterrorism response to the September 11 
attacks look with a president who did not ascribe to theories of vast inherent presidential power? 
The policies and practices of the Obama administration serve as an imperfect but worthwhile proxy 
for understanding whether a different theory of power would produce a different policy outcome.  
As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama positioned himself as starkly different from 
Bush and campaigned on the promise of change. He was critical of the government’s policies in 
the years after 9/11 and its conduct in the war on terror. But importantly, his critique of Bush 
largely centered on rule of law concerns and correcting abuses of executive overreach and less so 
on civil liberties. In a survey of presidential candidates’ views on executive power conducted by 
Savage, then at The Boston Globe, Obama criticized Bush’s counterterrorism actions but focused 
on the ways in which he acted outside the legal framework of the Constitution rather than the 
substance of the policies themselves. He rejected the Bush administration’s claim that “the 
President has plenary authority under the Constitution to detain U.S. citizens without charges as 
unlawful enemy combatants” and claimed that it would be “illegal and unwise” for a president to 
disregard international human rights treaties, explaining, “the Commander-in-Chief power does 
not allow the President to defy those treaties.”326 In doing so, he signaled a different theory of 
presidential powers, one based not in inherent powers, but rather more firmly in the rule of law. 
Less than two months after taking office, the Obama administration announced that it 
would no longer classify prisoners in the war on terror as enemy combatants. In a press release 
issued on March 13, 2009, the Justice Department formally withdrew the enemy combatant 
definition for Guantánamo detainees. Its statement read like a direct rebuke of the Bush 
administration’s policies and theoretical underpinnings: “The Department of Justice submitted a 
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new standard for the government’s authority to hold detainees at the Guantanamo Bay Detention 
Facility. The definition does not rely on the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief 
independent of Congress’s specific authorization. It draws on the international laws of war to 
inform the statutory authority conferred by Congress. It provides that individuals who supported 
al Qaeda or the Taliban are detainable only if the support was substantial. And it does not employ 
the phrase ‘enemy combatant.’"327 The shift in theory and legal reasoning was evident; in a turn 
away from the Bush administration, the Obama administration signaled that it would not base its 
claim of authority to detain suspected terrorists in the president’s Article II authority as 
commander-in-chief. Instead, the statement explained that the administration had the statutory 
authority to hold detainees at Guantánamo: “In its filing today, the government bases its authority 
to hold detainees at Guantanamo on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which 
Congress passed in September 2001…the government’s new standard relies on the international 
laws of war to inform the scope of the president’s authority under this statute, and makes clear that 
the government does not claim authority to hold persons based on insignificant or insubstantial 
support of al Qaeda or the Taliban.”328  
This policy was different from Bush’s in a few ways. First, as the statement mentioned, the 
administration dropped the enemy combatant term, which on its own did not carry legal 
significance and thus did not change the legal status of the prisoners. Second, again, the 
administration abandoned the Article II argument that the president had the inherent authority to 
detain enemy fighters. And third, whereas the Bush legal team interpreted the AUMF to give the 
president the authority to detain those who “support” terrorist groups, the Obama lawyers required 
                                                




that detainees had to “substantially support” al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated groups. But these 
changes were not substantively very different from that of the Bush administration. While the 
terminology was changed, the statement did not rule out indefinite military detentions for 
suspected terrorists. In other words, the argument was different but the practice was the same. 
Steven A. Engel, a senior lawyer responsible for detainee issues in the Office of Legal Counsel 
during the Bush administration, told The New York Times that the policy “seems fundamentally 
consistent with the positions of the prior administration.”329 
This new policy for detainees was instead largely symbolic and was, in many ways, a 
continuation of Bush’s enemy combatant policy. The same could be said of several other shifts 
Obama made from Bush’s counterterrorism policies, which, to the dismay of civil liberties 
advocates, continued many of the policies from the Bush era. Obama continued Bush’s policy of 
extraordinary rendition and the use of military commissions to try detainees (after temporarily 
stopping the process). And in other areas, Obama extended beyond Bush; his employment of 
targeted killing and expansion of the warrantless surveillance program, for example, was met with 
criticism by many. But perhaps most prominently, Obama failed to close the prison at Guantánamo 
Bay, which had been a major promise of his campaign. By the time Obama took office, the Bush 
administration had already transferred or released over 500 detainees out of Guantánamo and 240 
remained.330 On his second day in office, Obama ordered the prison at Guantánamo Bay to be 
closed within a year in order to “restore the standards of due process and the core constitutional 
values that have made this country great even in the midst of war, even in dealing with 
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terrorism.”331 Despite early bipartisan support for the prison’s closing, Obama’s efforts soon faced 
resistance when it became clear that closing Guantánamo would mean moving detainees to the 
United States, and for years, Congress blocked efforts by the administration to close the facility. 
In March 2011, realizing that closing Guantánamo would be virtually impossible due to 
Congressional opposition, Obama issued an executive order that permitted the indefinite detention 
of Guantánamo detainees and established a periodic review process.332 While this allowed for more 
frequent review of detainees’ cases, it institutionalized the system for the indefinite detention of 
prisoners at Guantánamo.333 When Obama left office, 41 prisoners remained at Guantánamo. As 
noted in Chapter Three, many of the remaining prisoners will likely stay at Guantánamo for the 
rest of their lives; these so-called “forever prisoners” are considered too dangerous for release but 
the government has too little admissible evidence (much of the evidence was obtained through 
torture in CIA black sites) to bring them to trial.334 Even those who are to be brought to trial have 
faced a slow process. The trial of five men accused of having planned the September 11 attacks, 
for example, has been set for next year, nearly 20 years after the attacks. This delay is due to 
lengthy pretrial proceedings, infrequent hearings, and additional complexities that arose from the 
government’s decision to seek the death penalty.335 
Obama’s inability to close Guantánamo shows the complexity of the separation of powers 
issue and exposes an irony of my argument that Bush should have consulted Congress because it 
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is precisely congressional inaction that let Guantánamo remain open. For Obama to have closed 
Guantánamo given the Congress he had, he would have had to use unilateral power. Had Obama 
taken more executive action on the issue of Guantánamo, the prison may have closed but the rule 
of law would be threatened. The situation is a reminder that consulting Congress does not 
necessarily produce a more favorable policy decision or one more in line with civil liberties, but 
this exceptional case nonetheless indicates the importance of Congress’s role in national security 
policy. 
Differences between the Bush and Obama administrations in the classification and 
treatment of those captured in the war on terror, while often symbolic, are not insignificant. Jack 
Goldsmith, former head of the Office of Legal Counsel under Bush, claims, “almost all of the 
Obama changes have been at the level of packaging, argumentation, symbol, and rhetoric.”336 Yet 
Goldsmith explains that by abandoning the Bush administration’s argument that the president had 
the constitutional authority to detain enemy soldiers without Congressional support (but not 
rejecting it), the Obama administration gained favorable press coverage for departing from Bush’s 
position. While some see this as a move to save face, Goldsmith suggests that it allowed the policy 
outcomes—that is, the detention of enemy fighters—to gain legitimacy. “The president simply 
cannot exercise these powers over an indefinite period unless Congress and the courts support him. 
And they will not support him unless they think he is exercising his powers responsibly, under 
law, with real constraints, to address a real threat,” Goldsmith wrote. “The Obama strategy can 
thus be seen as an attempt to make the core Bush approach to terrorism politically and legally more 
palatable, and thus sustainable.”337 The changes to enemy combatant policy show one of many 
                                                




attempts made by the Obama administration to legalize and normalize what Bush created largely 
through executive power alone, suggesting a focus of the administration on the rule of law. By 
legalizing and normalizing these national security tools, Obama legitimized and actually 
strengthened executive power. In my interview with Martin Lederman, former deputy assistant 
attorney general in the OLC under Obama, he explained what he saw as the difference between 
the Obama and Bush administration’s approach to executive power: “One really huge contrast 
between Bush and Obama was…Obama was mostly, although there are a couple of exceptions, 
committed to idea of: ‘first of all, I am going to exercise statutory powers over constitutional 
powers, but more than that, even when I abide by constitutional powers, I am going to abide by 
statutory limits.’”338 The practices of the Obama administration through the lens of enemy 
combatant policy suggest that a different theory of presidential power may not have changed the 
substance of the policies of the Bush administration. Yet, this study suggests that a conception of 
presidential power that did not ascribe to a broad theory of inherent presidential authority could 
have placed the policies on stronger legal grounds, which in fact would have further entrenched 
the policies. 
Obama also acted like Bush in some of his claims to presidential war power. Obama faced 
widespread criticism for pursuing U.S. intervention in Libya in 2011 without congressional 
authorization, which many considered an overreach of executive power and a violation of the 1973 
War Powers Act. The Act states that if a president does not get congressional authorization within 
60 days of military action, he or she must halt the operations within 30 days. After failing to attain 
congressional approval, the administration continued its air war against Libyan armed forces by 
claiming its actions fell outside the War Powers restrictions because no troops were on the ground 
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and there was no sustained fighting. An OLC memo signed in April 2011 claimed that the president 
had the constitutional authority as commander in chief to direct military action in Libya because 
"he could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the national interest”—an argument 
evocative of Theodore Roosevelt’s stewardship theory. 339 It also asserted that congressional 
approval was not necessary because of the limited nature of the operations.340 This claim of 
constitutional authority based on the president’s commander in chief powers was strongly 
reminiscent of those made by the Bush administration. 
The Obama administration’s war power claims for the Libya conflict were paralleled in the 
Trump administration’s claims for airstrikes against Syria seven years later. An April 2018 OLC 
memo used the same framework that the OLC under Obama used to conclude the airstrikes in 
Libya were constitutional. It argued that the president “could lawfully direct airstrikes on facilities 
associated with Syria’s chemical- weapons capability because he had reasonably determined that 
the use of force would be in the national interest” and because the hostilities were not at the “level 
of war in the constitutional sense.”341 The Trump administration made a similar argument as the 
Obama administration that only “prolonged and substantial military engagements, typically 
involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial period” 
constitute wars that warrant congressional authorization.342 This framework allows for a wide 
range of military force that would be permitted without congressional approval. As Curtis Bradley 
and Jack Goldsmith write in Lawfare, modern presidents rely largely on tools like drones and 
manned airstrikes that allow for military action from a distance. For these now-ubiquitous military 
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actions, the administration’s framework sidelines Congress.  
As a candidate for the presidency, Donald Trump promised to reverse Obama’s 
counterterrorism decisions. Whereas Obama had attempted to close the military prison at 
Guantánamo Bay and worked to decrease its population, Trump promised to keep the prison open 
and “load it up with some bad dudes,” including U.S. citizens. And whereas Obama firmly held 
an anti-torture principle, Trump vowed to bring back waterboarding and other “enhanced 
interrogation” techniques from the Bush era.343 A year into his presidency, Trump signed an 
executive order to signal his commitment to this shift away from Obama’s counterterrorism 
policies; in January 2018, Trump ordered the prison at Guantánamo Bay to remain open (revoking 
Obama’s executive order) and affirmed that additional enemy combatants could be detained 
there.344  
 As president, Trump has ascribed to a theory of absolute executive power. “I have an 
Article II, where I have the right to do whatever I want as president,” Trump declared in 2019 in a 
statement reminiscent of Richard Nixon’s interview with David Frost when he infamously said, 
“When a president does it, it means it’s not illegal.”345 In April 2020, Trump declared, “When 
somebody’s the president of the United States, the authority is total,” claiming that as president, 
he, not state governors, had the power to decide when to lift social distancing rules put in place 
during the COVID-19 crisis.346 Trump’s rhetoric of executive power has shocked many. Even John 
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Yoo, who established the legal framework for Bush’s most extreme claims of executive power, 
expressed “grave concerns” with Trump’s view of executive power early in his presidency. Yoo 
cited Trump’s campaign promise to appoint justices to the Supreme Court to investigate his 
opponent Hillary Clinton, his plan to build a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico, and his 
“Muslim ban” as examples of “executive power run amok.”347  
Despite an apparent eagerness to revert to the national security policies of the years 
following the September 11 attack, including widespread detention at Guantánamo and the use 
torture techniques, as well as a penchant for vast executive powers, the Trump administration has 
not increased the Guantánamo population (it has not substantially decreased it either—only one 
detainee has been transferred out). One reason for this may be because bringing a new prisoner to 
Guantánamo could open the floodgates for challenges to the authorization for ongoing military 
presence in the Middle East. This issue is exemplified by the 2017 case of an unnamed American 
citizen captured in Syria while fighting for ISIS. The fighter, called John Doe, was being held 
incommunicado in Iraq without enough evidence to be brought to trial. While similar to the 
premise of the enemy combatant cases covered in Chapter Four, the Trump administration did not 
bring the prisoner to the United States or hold him at Guantánamo Bay. Doing so would have 
allowed the prisoner to bring a habeas petition to the courts, as established in Rasul, which could 
allow for judicial evaluation of whether he is detained legally, and thus whether the 2001 AUMF 
actually extends to the U.S. conflict with ISIS as the Obama and Trump administrations have 
claimed.348 A ruling against the administration would undermine its justification for the use of 
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force in Iraq and Syria. 
 Many critics have argued that Trump’s rhetoric of inherent presidential power outpaces his 
exercise of power and that he has not followed with concrete action. The impetus for these claims 
of presidential power is different from most previous presidents. As journalist David Graham 
explained, “Past presidents have frequently tested the limits of their powers—and of the 
Constitution—on national security, war powers, and push-pull interactions with the legislature. 
But Trump seems to be pushing against the limits of his presidential power almost entirely to 
protect himself.”349 Graham argues that unlike claims of power made by Bush, Trump’s claims of 
power arise not from emergency or necessity for public safety, but rather for personal reasons, 
such as protecting himself and his campaign from investigation.  
Today, there are 40 detainees still held at Guantánamo Bay. The government has not 
classified any new prisoners as enemy combatants but continues to hold the remaining 
Guantánamo detainees indefinitely. While a group small in number, the prisoners represent the 
legacy of the enemy combatant policies nearly two decades after the September 11 attacks. They 
represent a novel legal system created after the attacks that allowed for citizens and noncitizens to 
be detained—at first without access to a lawyer or trial. They represent an extraordinary increase 
in executive power that was premised on the idea that the president is not bounded by statute or 
treaty, and was therefore effectively above the law. And they represent the challenges of ending 
the long war on terror. To prevent this period of enlarged presidential power from becoming an 
enduring fixture of the American system, it is incumbent on a future president or Congress to revise 
the legal framework established by the Bush administration, and built upon by the Obama and 
                                                




Trump administrations, to reduce the powers of the president and swing the pendulum of power 
away from the presidency. Ultimately, this responsibility falls on voters too, who hold the ability 
to check presidential power by electing presidents who follow the rule of law and protect 
democratic systems. The national security policies of the Bush administration suggest, as the 
Framers understood centuries ago, that presidential power left unchecked poses a great threat to 
the rule of law and effective governance. 
Justice Jackson’s words serve as a reminder for this principle: “With all its defects, delays 
and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government 
except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary 
deliberations."350 
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